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This work is a study of the changing nature of US print media coverage of the Russo-Chechen 
conflict before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001. More specifically, it analyzes three 
major print news publications–The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street 
Journal–and their coverage of six separate alleged Chechen terrorist attacks on Russian soil, all 
of which were related to the Russo-Chechen conflict. The importance of this work rests in the 
power of language and rhetoric in the media and the way that this power can influence readers’ 
perceptions of external events. This study highlights the way in which the experience of 
September 11th influenced the US print media’s perception and presentation of Russian-Chechen 
conflicts. In analyzing the three newspapers, this author collected all relevant articles covering 
each event within a seven-day radius after the occurrence of the event. This author then used 
critical language analysis to determine specific and repetitive frames of representation that 
occurred within the coverage of each event, and compared the patterns of frames of 
representation presented by the newspapers before and after the attacks of September 11th. The 
shifting frames of representation within the coverage of the three newspapers indicate there was 
a significant change in interpretation of the Russo-Chechen conflict after the attacks of 
September 11th. While the newspapers’ coverage shifted by varying degrees, the post-9/11 
reporting was characterized by an overall trend of more personal, less balanced, and less 
historically grounded reporting. As a result of this, readers of these three publications 
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 v 
encountered a much different interpretation of the Russo-Chechen conflict in the post-9/11 era 
than had been the case prior to 9/11. Overall, this work contributes to a discussion of the bias 
within media coverage that occurs as the result of the personal experience and ideology of the 
editorial staff. This work is also a cautionary tale that highlights the need for a critical analysis in 
the consumption of authoritative media sources. 
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 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This work analyzes the coverage and representation of the Russo-Chechen conflict, in particular 
alleged Chechen terrorist acts on Russian soil, in selected print media of the United States. 
Specifically, it analyzes the language and discourse used to describe the conflict both before and 
after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The ongoing conflict between the Russian Federation 
(and formerly the Soviet Union and Russian Empire) and the peoples of the North Caucasus, 
including Chechnya, has resulted in violence and bloodshed for almost three centuries.1 
However, this paper focuses on the most recent developments in that conflict, the increasingly 
brutal attacks by Chechen separatists into Russia proper before, during, and after the Second 
Russo-Chechen War (1999-2009).2 Although the history of the conflict is intriguing, violent, and 
incredibly complex, this paper will focus instead on the coverage of this conflict abroad, 
specifically on its reception and interpretation by US print media.   
The reason for this focus on media, which this author will expand upon later, lies in the 
inherent power of media sources in constructing the rhetoric and perspective through which the 
mass public views and understands an external event.3 In this case, trusted US media sources 
                                                 
1 Ali Askerov, Historical Dictionary of the Chechen Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), ix. 
2 While Russian officials including President Vladimir Putin declared the end to the war on several occasions, large-
scale military operations did not cease until 2009, and fighting/bombings continue to occur intermittently. See, 
Askerov, Historical Dictionary of the Chechen Conflict, 201. 
3 Roger Fowler, Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press (New York;London;: Routledge,1991) 
1-9; Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny, eds. Media, Religion and Conflict (Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009), 5-7.  
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(such as the established print media) become the authority through which readers are provided a 
picture of the Russo-Chechen conflict, and thus have great influence over how the US public 
perceives and relates to the events therein. This paper seeks to analyze the ways in which US 
print media frames particular events of the conflict and how these “frames of representation” 
shift over time.4 
This paper theorizes that the catalyst for such a shift stems from the US experience of the 
attacks on September 11, 2001. The Russian political leadership has always branded the second 
war in Chechnya (1999-2009) as a counter-terrorist operation to combat the evils of international 
extremism. However, it was not until after the events of September 11th and the declaration by 
the Bush Administration of the ‘Global War on Terror’ that the US government began to support 
such Russian claims.5 This paper thus serves as a study of how the experience of 9/11 influenced 
and changed the US print media’s coverage and rhetoric regarding Russia’s self-proclaimed 
‘War on Terror.’6 Although this change may seem obvious, as this study shows, the impact of an 
event (such as 9/11) can have a profound influence on how the media covers other issues. This in 
turn has a key effect on how readers, the public, and policymakers come to understand and 
discuss events. As a result, this change may have major implications for how an external event, 
such as the Russo-Chechen conflict, is internalized and reacted to by the US as a whole. 
In accomplishing this task, this chapter will first lay out some background evidence on 
the importance and power of language and media in influencing and affecting the public 
perception of events. This section illustrates not only the relevance of this research, but also the 
                                                 
4 Luke Mathew Peterson, Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media: Contending Discourses (London: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 29. 
5 John Russell, “Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens Before and Since 
9/11.” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2005): 107-12. 




importance of critical language analysis in identifying media bias. This chapter will then discuss 
the specific research methodologies and sources used to carry out this research, and address the 
potential limitations of such an analysis. Finally, before delving into the source analysis, it is 
prudent to provide some significant background information on the history, nature, and current 
status of the conflict, as well as the major actors that will appear in the analysis. This section will 
also acknowledge, explain, and justify the six media events selected for analysis. 
1.1 MEDIA, LANGUAGE, AND POWER 
There is perhaps no stronger force in the world for instilling, spreading, and consolidating ideas 
than that of mass media.7 For many, media provides a window on to the outside world, a world 
normally too distant to be accessed, and thus holds powerful influence over the perceptions and 
perspectives of citizens. Examples of this power can be seen throughout the modern era, 
including the powerful effect of the news coverage of US casualties in Somalia that quickly 
swayed public opinion against sustained action in the region.8 In the course of many conflicts, 
the sheer distance of the events from readers further magnifies this power.9 It is the role of the 
news media to transfer these occurrences and take something previously inaccessible, like an 
explosion at a factory in China or an election in Ukraine, and place it on the television or coffee 
table of the average US citizen. While this feat is impressive, it is also inherently very dangerous. 
                                                 
7 For more on the power of mass media in uniting and consolidating national communities, see Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities (Rev. ed. New York;London: Verso, 2006). 
8 Susan D. Moeller, “Locating Accountability: the Media and Peacekeeping.” Journal of International Affairs 55, 
no. 2 (2002): 369.  
9 Greg Simons, Mass Media and Modern Warfare Reporting on the Russian War on Terrorism. (Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2010.), 190. 
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As historian Luke Peterson argues, “the flow of information in this model is substantially 
unidirectional.”10 The risk of this is that due to a lack of genuine dialogue, the news media earns 
an authoritative status over the interpretation, and hence understanding of distant events, lulling 
the public into a sense of implicit trust. The public views the news media (especially the 
established print media) as a clear window on to the facts of events in the outside world. 
However, in actuality, the image provided by the media is inevitably refracted through language, 
discourse, and selection, providing an inherently biased result that is tainted with the perspective 
of the media outlet itself.11  
The purpose of this argument is not to simply attack news media for bias, but to instead 
point out the inevitable trace of ideology and opinion that seeps into even the most stringent 
news reporting. As analyst Richard Fowler describes, “anything that is said or written about the 
world is articulated from a particular ideological position.”12 News is not created in a vacuum, 
devoid of bias; it is created by regular people with their own inherent ideological perspective. In 
this sense, even if the bias is unintentional or subconsciously applied, any piece of news writing 
is innately subjective. The creators of news media are subject to the same influences and 
experiences as anyone else and thus their work also reflects this experience and perspective.13 
The very nature of the media industry ensures that news writing is a product of its environment 
rather than an unbiased source of facts.  
The authoritative position assigned to the media drapes a veil of legitimacy over the fact 
that the news industry is just that, an industry. The New York Times and The Washington Post are 
businesses, and thus are subject to the same limitations and requirements of any business in a 
                                                 
10 Peterson, Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media, 21. 
11 Fowler, Language in the News, 10-11. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Peterson, Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media, 21. 
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market-economy. Media outlets exist in a competitive environment, one in which news is 
merchandise, not fact. This is not to criticize news publications, but to point out that the media is 
not independent from the effects of market and social demands. As Fowler insightfully notes, 
“News is not a natural phenomenon emerging straight from ‘reality’, but a product. It is 
produced by an industry, shaped by the bureaucratic and economic structure of that industry, by 
the relations between media and other industries and, most importantly, by relations with the 
government and with other political organizations.”14 News media not only supplies society with 
its particular perception of reality, it also reflects the reality of society as well.  
In news media, language and rhetoric serve as the main constructors of perspective. 
Although the selection of coverage plays an important role in shaping readers’ perceptions, how 
the coverage is presented (i.e. the language and rhetoric used) has a powerful impact on the 
readers’ interpretation of an event.15 More than just communicating the news, language serves as 
the method through which people construct and understand their social, cultural, and political 
reality.16 Thus, the language itself that the news media uses to describe news carries with it 
particular pre-established values that help the reader form a mental representation and 
understanding of an event.17 Whether the author is aware of it or not, his/her rhetoric is already 
imprinted with specific ideologies and thus conveys a special, sometimes subconscious meaning 
to consumers. For a simple and relevant example, think of the two labels “terrorist” and 
                                                 
14 Fowler, Language in the News, 223. 
15 Susan D. Moeller, Packaging Terrorism: Co-opting the News for Politics and Profit (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 84-85. 
16 Robin Tolmach Lakoff, and Inc ebrary, The Language War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 20-
23; Fowler, Language in the News, 5. 
17 Fowler, Language in the News, 41-42; for more information on the linkages between language and thought, see 
Walter Kintsch, The Representation of Meaning in Memory (Hillsdale, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1974); L. 
S. Vygotskiĭ and Alex Kozulin, Thought and Language (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986); Norman Fairclough, 
Language and Power (New York;London;: Longman, 1989). 
 
 6 
“guerrilla”. Both of these terms are often used to label characters in media coverage, but they 
carry with them very different implications for the reader. “Terrorist” is a term heavily laden 
with negative value. In the eyes of a reader, the person labeled as such is evil and immoral, and 
his or her actions are stripped of any political, cultural, or historical context, making them 
unprovoked and unjustifiable. “Guerrilla” on the other hand, implies a more relatable or 
humanized person. While their actions may be heinous, they are following political motives with 
an explicit goal in mind. Although both of these terms could be used to describe the same actor 
in many conflict scenarios (and are in the cases identified in this study), the representation they 
provide to media consumers can be vastly different.18 It is through this descriptive and loaded 
language that news media creates frames through which the public comes to understand external 
events. 
In the coverage of conflicts, this influence often becomes even more magnified by the 
reinforcing effect of repeated and accepted rhetoric. The dichotomous nature of conflicts tends to 
polarize discussions and oftentimes, especially in specific news outlets, one particular narrative 
will become dominant. This theme or frame of reference becomes the accepted interpretation of 
the conflict and newcomers to the discussion can only operate within the parameters of this 
established view.19 The self-propagating nature of the dominant discourse also limits the power 
of communication of the writer.20 In this way, all other perspectives of the conflict are snuffed 
out over time, leaving consumers with just one representation to which they can subscribe. The 
repetition of these frames also deepens the effect of the discourse by providing the consumer 
                                                 
18 The debate over the usage of the ‘terrorist’ as a label is very prevalent in media discussions, for more information 
see, Susan D. Moeller, Packaging Terrorism: Co-opting the News for Politics and Profit. 
19 Simons, Mass  Media and Modern Warfare, 90-91. 
20 Fowler, Language in the News, 41-42. 
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with a more established and reinforced mental representation.21 To challenge the accepted and 
dominant understanding is difficult, as this would mean challenging the social norms of the 
greater public.22 Thus the very nature of conflict coverage itself only serves to amplify the power 
of the news media over public understanding. 
Further, apart from influencing the public’s perception of the outside world, news media 
in the United States also exerts a significant influence over policymakers. In participatory 
democracies like the US, politicians are directly responsible to the public and must respond to 
demands in order to secure re-election. Thus, as the news media influences public opinion of 
external events, its reporting also influences the foreign policy of the democracy.23 The discourse 
that defines distant conflicts in the media becomes the discourse through which citizens and 
policymakers alike discuss and analyze a conflict. Examples of a political manifestation of the 
power of media language are numerous (as with the previously addressed case of US withdrawal 
from Somalia), however a distinctly relevant case can be seen in the conclusion of the First 
Russo-Chechen War. It was in-depth, gruesome media coverage of the fighting that drove 
international and public opinion against the Russian invasion, eventually forcing an end to the 
war in 1996.24 Thus, the consequences of media coverage are often far more substantial than 
either the producer or consumer realize. 
The news media is then far from the independent and unbiased guarantor of the facts that 
it is often claimed to be in liberal political theory. Instead, much like any publication, news is a 
product of its environment and of the prevailing ideology. For this reason, news media’s large 
                                                 
21 Peterson, Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media, 5. 
22 Nick Couldry and James Curran, Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World (Lanham, 
Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 39. 
23 Marsden and Savigny, Media, Religion and Conflict, 4-5. 
24 Graeme P. Herd, “The Russo-Chechen Information Warfare and 9/11: Al-qaeda Through the South Caucasus 
Looking Glass?” European Security 11, no. 4 (2002): 110-112. 
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influence of over public opinion and foreign policy calls for readers to take a more analytical and 
critical approach to reading and interpreting the news. 
 
1.2 SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
In the age of the technology, the US news media is increasingly exiting the platform of the 
printed page and making the transition to a more modern digital format on the Internet. However, 
several factors demonstrate the continued relevance and influence of the print news industry. 
First, to attribute decreasing circulation numbers to the end of the age of newspapers is rash. 
Newspapers are not disappearing, they are adapting.25 As with any business, newspapers are 
adjusting their strategies to changes in technology in order to remain relevant and profitable. For 
this reason, almost all major newspapers now use both digital and print formats. Second, despite 
the increasing ease of access to information provided by technology, the sheer number of 
unverified and illegitimate sources on the Internet lends a certain sense of quality and authority 
to the established print media. The very nature of online sources—their lack of regulation and 
complete openness—actually serves to delegitimize their potential as news providers.26 This 
established legitimacy grants particular print news a niche that is uninhabited by any other news 
sources and also magnifies the potential impact of the newspapers on actors who value valid and 
quality news, such as policymakers and the portion of the public that is attentive to foreign 
events. A final testament to the lasting impact of the print media is the fact that “items in print 
                                                 
25 Bob Franklin, Pulling Newspapers Apart: Analysing Print Journalism. (New York;London;: Routledge), 2008, 3-
5. 
26 Peterson, Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media, 4-5. 
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retain a more lasting, more substantial impact upon cognition.”27 Overall, despite the increase in 
the quantity of potential news sources accompanying the rise in technology, print news media 
retains a position of importance and influence in modern society. 
When selecting the newspapers for this analysis, particular attention was paid to the 
quality, impact, and influence of each publication. The newspapers examined in this paper–The 
New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal–are all papers of 
considerable repute and significance in US media. All three papers are among the highest in 
circulation in the country, ranking second, seventh, and first respectively.28 Additionally, each 
paper has renowned international coverage and maintains a web of foreign bureaus and 
correspondents, including in Moscow, for the entire timespan of this analysis. This means that 
rather than draw their information from the stories of the Associated Press or other publications, 
these paper’s reporters were able to investigate the events in Russia firsthand. This ability to 
report on location also means that these papers have an impact on the print news community, as 
many smaller and less profitable papers draw on their primary reports in order to cover 
international events. Thus the impact of these papers on discourse and perception is actually 
much larger than circulation numbers suggest. The three papers have additionally all adapted 
effectively to the demands of online publication, and their established authority and status give 
them high standing in political and intellectual communities. 
Moreover, each of these papers also bears individual traits that warrant subjecting their 
coverage to analysis. The New York Times (hereafter referred to as New York Times or the 
Times), besides being the newspaper of record in the US, has very personal and important 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 "Top 10 Newspapers By Circulation: Wall Street Journal Leads Weekday Circulation." The Huffington Post, July 
1, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/01/newspaper-circulation-top-10_n_3188612.html 
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connections to the coverage of terrorist attacks and the Global War on Terror. The very location 
of the New York Times headquarters in Manhattan means that many staff experienced the attacks 
of September 11th on a more personal level. Additionally, the Times was noted for its in-depth 
and harrowing coverage of the attack, winning six Pulitzer Prizes for its reporting on the event.29 
The Washington Post (hereafter referred to as Washington Post or the Post) is the primary 
publication of the nation’s political capital, giving it a significant impact over the perceptions of 
the nation’s leading policymakers and foreign policy analysts. Further, the Post also encountered 
its own personal experience with terrorism due to the attack on the Pentagon building on 
September 11th. The Wall Street Journal (hereafter referred to as Wall Street Journal or the 
Journal) provides a slightly different perspective than the other two papers, utilizing a different 
context for analysis. As an economically focused publication, the Journal is also well known for 
its international reporting and has additionally felt the scarring touch of terrorism. Not only was 
the Journal present front and center at its Manhattan headquarters for the attacks on September 
11th, but the paper was also the victim of one of the first and most publicized terrorist attacks 
following the attacks. The kidnapping and eventual execution of Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 
January 2002 was a highly publicized tragedy for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.30 As a 
result, all three of these papers have very personalized relationships to the War on Terror. This, 
combined with their extensive reach and influence over both public opinion and policymakers, 
means these publications are very relevant for an analysis of terrorism and Russian policy both 
before and after September 11th.  
In order to limit this work temporally, this study focuses on six separate events in order to 
analyze the coverage of the three publications in each instance. All of these events were 
                                                 
29 Moeller, Packaging Terrorism, 62. 
30 Moeller, Packaging Terrorism, 156. 
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instances of deliberate attacks on civilians on Russian soil outside of Chechnya. The events, 
which will be described and placed in historical context in the next section, were chosen not only 
based on the amount of international publicity each received, but also in order to ensure a 
balance chronologically: three occurred before September 11, 2001 and three occurred after. 
Other factors contributing to the selection of the events were the location and nature of each of 
the attacks, as well as their relative comparability to the other events. The first three attacks–the 
Apartment Bombings in the Russian cities of Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk (September 
1999); the Underpass Bombing in Moscow (August 2000); and the Car Bomb attacks in the 
Stavropol Region near the Chechen border (March 2001)–all occurred before September 11, 
2001 and the subsequent declaration of the Global War on Terror. The second three–the 
Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis in Moscow (October 2002); the Subway Bombing in Moscow 
(February 2004); and the Beslan School Hostage Crisis in North Ossetia near the Chechen border 
(September 2004)–occurred after the US experience of September 11th and thus serve as 
effective comparative counterpoints to the first three events in both timing and location31. This 
type of event analysis and comparison is not unique to this paper, which has been inspired by 
several previous media studies.32  
 In order to compile articles for the analysis, the online databases of each of the three 
newspapers were accessed through Proquest, and searched using both date-sensitive and 
keyword-based content searches. For the purpose of consistency and control over the quantity of 
articles, the search for articles included a date range of seven days after the conclusion of the 
                                                 
31 Both the Car Bomb attacks and the Beslan School Hostage Crisis occur in the Caucasus region in areas bordering 
the Republic of Chechnya.  
32 Des Freedman and Daya Kishan Thussu, Media and Terrorism: Global Perspectives (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012), 
184-205; Peterson, Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media, 6-8. 
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event.33 At this point, coverage of each event had dwindled, but the range still allowed for the 
full extent of details surrounding the events to be included in the articles.34 The articles selected 
for this study included news articles, editorials, and commentary. Although editorials and 
commentary are opinion pieces, they must still gain approval from the editorial staff of the 
newspaper, and thus represent an ideological product of the publication. Further, because they 
influence the readership and public opinion, opinion pieces are important parts of event coverage 
and as such cannot be ignored.35 This author compiled and ordered articles by both publication 
and chronology for the analysis.36 
 This paper employs qualitative discourse evaluation as its primary analytical 
methodology. Qualitative analysis allows for the close-examination of each article as a whole 
and within the context of the overall coverage; hence this study utilizes quotations from the 
articles themselves in order to justify its conclusions.37 Additionally, by utilizing a qualitative 
method of analysis, the conclusions of this study can be insulated from the effects of wider 
global events. Western media outlets tend to cover events that directly affect Westerners or 
domestic actors over strictly foreign events.38 Thus, conclusions from a purely quantitative 
analysis of media coverage may misattribute the causation of the fluctuations, a potential 
oversight that is much less likely in a qualitative analysis. This author evaluated each article 
separately using methods of critical language analysis in order to establish the repetitive themes 
                                                 
33 This strategy was also used in a similar study of the Russian media, see Freedman and Thussu, Media and 
Terrorism, 184-205. 
34 In the case of the Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis, the date range was expanded 2 days after the conclusion of 
the crisis (from 10/23/2002-11/4/2002) in order to include the coverage of the identification of the gas used by 
Russian Special Forces to end the crisis. The controversy over the gas sparked a large media debate that is important 
to acknowledge in this study. 
35 Franklin, Pulling Newspapers Apart, 70. 
36 For a complete list of the articles analyzed from each newspaper, see Appendix A. 
37 When referring to the reporting of publications in this study, this author uses the present tense in adherence with 
the Chicago Manual of Style, see http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html 
38 Moeller, Packaging Terrorism, 68-73. 
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or “frames of representation” presented by each publication’s coverage of the events.39 As 
previously noted, the frames of representation serve to illustrate the ideological perspective of 
the event that each publication supplied to its readers. This frame becomes both the discourse 
and interpretation of the event, and thus influences the reaction of public opinion to the event. 
This method of study is relatively common in the media analysis field and was inspired by 
several other publications.40 In order to draw conclusions from the research, this author 
compared the established frames of representation within each publication to determine if 
coverage changed after September 11, 2001. This allowed for conclusions as to the overall effect 
of the experience of September 11th on the media coverage of Russia’s ‘War on Terror’ provided 
by the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal.  
 It is prudent to acknowledge that this particular methodology does, however, have several 
inherent limitations. Firstly, this study, as with any qualitative research, is by definition a 
subjective analysis. Just as print news is a creation plagued with innate ideological perspective, 
so this work is similarly a product of this author’s perspective. However, mindful of this 
potential bias, this author has taken precautions through repeated and careful analysis of the 
articles and also the use of direct quotations in justifying frames of representation in order to 
ensure that the conclusions drawn from this study are valid, unbiased, and controlled. 
Additionally, this author recognizes the limitations of the narrow range of analysis defined in this 
                                                 
39 Although the social cognition concept of ‘themes’ or ‘frames’ is common in the media analysis field (see footnote 
40 below), the specific term “frame of representation” is owed to Dr. Luke Peterson (see, Peterson, Palestine-Israel 
in the Print News Media, 2015). The methodology created by Dr. Peterson serves as a large part of the inspiration 
for the methodology of this study and this author feels that the term “frame of representation” best embodies the 
given concept. 
40 For examples of qualitative discourse analysis and the usage of the ‘frames’ or themes as a technique see, Fowler, 
Language in the News, 66-90; Scott Radnitz, “Look Who’s Talking! Islamic Discourse in the Chechen 
Wars.” Nationalities Papers 34, no. 2 (2006): 238-40; David L. Altheide, Terror post 9/11 and the Media. (Vol. 
4.;4;. New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 49; Marsden and Lee, Mass Media and Modern Warfare, 1-2; Freedman and 
Thussu, Media, Religion and Conflict, 194-95. For more background on the social cognition theory of frames see, 
Lakoff, The Language War, 47-48. 
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paper. Due to limitations of time and accessibility, an examination of all media coverage of the 
Russian War on Terror would have been impossible. Thus, the conclusions from this study 
cannot claim to represent an all-encompassing change throughout the entire breadth of national 
media. However, this analysis may still provide an important insight into the imperfect nature of 
media coverage as well as draw attention to the need for critical and attentive consumption of 
print media. Additionally, this study may serve as an important contribution to the field of media 
analysis with regards to the study of the effects of domestic crises on the external perspective of 
the media. 
1.3 RUSSIA AND CHECHNYA: CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS 
Before delving into the actual analysis of these publications, it is necessary to provide some 
historical and cultural context for the Russo-Chechen conflict and the major actors involved in its 
most recent manifestation. This section will highlight the importance of this study’s chosen 
subject and will conclude with descriptions and backgrounds on the six media events that are 
analyzed in the following chapters. 
The full history of Russo-Chechen conflict stretches back as far as the seventeenth 
century, and encompasses multiple waves of resistance, deportation, and war resulting in a 
shocking amount of brutality and bloodshed.41 However, for the purposes of this study, a quick 
examination of the most significant events in forming the historical and cultural relationship 
between the two actors will suffice. Although, clashes between Russian Imperial forces and the 
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tribal clans of the North Caucasus had begun in the 18th century, it was the Great Caucasian War, 
which lasted from the early-19th century until 1864, which established a lasting image of 
Chechen resistance and Russian domination within the conflict.42 Ironically, it was the Russian 
invasion that unified the Chechen tribes (and others of the North Caucasus) behind a single cause 
in the first place, a theme that would repeat itself throughout the conflict.43  The war served to 
solidify negative cross-cultural perceptions between the groups, which only worsened as the 
conflict wore on.44 
Although there was seldom peace in the Caucasus between 1864 and the collapse of the 
Russian Empire in 1917, Chechnya was still quickly absorbed into the Soviet Union as the 
Bolsheviks consolidated power, marking a new era of external rule.45 However, Soviet rule 
proved to be just as disastrous for Russo-Chechen relations as the Tsarist rule of the past. In 
1943, in the midst of the Second World War, Stalin and the Soviet leadership decided to deport 
the entirety of the Chechen population, totaling almost 500,000 civilians (along with several 
other ethnic groups), due to perceived disloyalty and a suspicion of collaboration with the 
Germans.46 The Chechens were rounded up and sent by truck and train to exile in Siberia and 
Central Asia. Soviet troops used ruthless tactics and those in villages too remote for deportation 
“were either shot en masse or herded into barns and burned alive.”47 However, the violent 
strategies of the Soviets also had the unforeseen side effect of strengthening Chechen identity 
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and clan structure, as well as deepening resentment towards the Soviet system.48 This event 
remains very prominent in Chechen cultural memory. As John Russell describes it, the 
deportation “of every last Chechen man, woman and child is etched deeply into the collective 
cultural narrative of the Chechen people.”49 Although Chechens were allowed to return to their 
lands in 1956, relations with Moscow remained unstable up until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.50 
Given its tumultuous history of resistance to external rule, it is not surprising that as the 
Soviet Union was collapsing, Chechnya quickly seized the opportunity for freedom, declaring 
independence on November 1, 1991.51 However, the brief era of independence in Chechnya from 
1991-94 was characterized by excessive lawlessness and criminal violence, which then-President 
Zhokar Dudayev failed to adequately stem.52 Meanwhile, after dealing with internal issues and 
negotiating partial autonomy with several other regions within the new Russian state, President 
Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Federation finally set its sights on Chechnya in 1994. Declaring 
what he believed would be a quick and easy war, Yeltsin ordered the invasion of Chechnya in 
December 1994, beginning what would turn out to be an embarrassing and costly failure for the 
Russian state.53 
 The First Russo-Chechen War was characterized by Russian military overconfidence and 
excessive brutality. The 1994 invasion that was supposed to produce victory in weeks turned into 
an extended nightmare, as unprepared Russian troops clashed with Chechen guerillas, who 
would not easily surrender their homeland to outside rule once again. In the 21-month conflict, 
                                                 
48 Fowkes, Russia and Chechnia, 10-11. 
49 Russell, “Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves”, 104. 
50 Fowkes, Russia and Chechnia, 11-13. 
51 Askerov, Historical Dictionary of the Chechen Conflict, xvi. 
52 Scott Radnitz, “Look Who’s Talking! Islamic Discourse in the Chechen Wars.” Nationalities Papers 34, no. 2 
(2006): 245. 
53 Russell, “Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves”, 105. 
 17 
Russian troops killed up to 100,000 Chechens, mostly civilians, with indiscriminate tactics and 
bombings.54 Additionally, despite the Russian government’s declarations of the Chechen 
guerillas as “terrorists,” open media coverage of the vast destruction and grave human rights 
abuses assured that public opinion remained firmly against the war, both in the West and in 
Russia proper.55 Human rights activists and reporters documented the callous tactics of Russian 
forces and their efforts played a key role in underscoring the purposeless nature of the conflict, a 
lesson not soon forgotten by Russian officials. Both international and domestic pressure 
eventually forced Yeltsin to end the war and to sign a deal for de facto independence with 
Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov, a moderate leader and former Soviet Army Colonel, in 
1996.56 
 However, like Russia in the 1990s, Chechnya was plagued by disorder and heavy crime 
after the end of the war, leaving Maskhadov, its new president, unable to consolidate control of 
the war-torn territory.57 This, combined with a series of apartment bombings in Russian cities, 
which the Russian government attributed to Chechen terrorists, led to the launching of a second 
Russian invasion in September of 1999.58 The renewed war effort was championed by Yeltsin’s 
new Prime Minister and soon to be acting-President, Vladimir Putin. Putin garnered strong 
public backing for a hardline response to the September bombings and rode the wave support 
into his first elected term as president in 2000.59 Although the second war differed from the first 
in that it began with a well-coordinated and well-organized invasion, the same violent and 
indiscriminate tactics came to dominate the Russian strategy partly as a result of the military’s 
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complete dehumanization of Chechens.60 Despite this, the longevity of the campaign was secured 
through well-planned control of the information war. 
From the beginning of the second war, Putin framed the invasion as an anti-terrorist 
effort, even ordering the media to only refer to Chechen opposition as “terrorists” as early as 
1999.61  The Russian President and state media often asserted that there were connections 
between the Chechen fighters and international terrorists like Osama Bin Laden.62 Additionally, 
Russian officials learned from the failures of the First Russ-Chechen War; the government took 
extensive steps to restrict media coverage of the conflict, starving both the domestic and 
international public of information.63 However, this strategy did not reach its full potential until 
after the events of September 11, 2001. Suddenly, Western governments quickly threw support 
to Putin’s claims as, “almost overnight, Russia became a key partner of the USA and its allies in 
the common struggle—the global war on terrorism.”64 With full international support and almost 
a complete blackout on media coverage, the war went on seemingly indefinitely. Western media 
began to refer to events in the war as “terrorist attacks” a phrase almost entirely absent in the first 
war.65 As a result, Putin essentially received a carte blanche to bomb Chechen targets 
indiscriminately and bury any political, cultural, or historical legitimacy to the separatist 
movement.66 
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Although Putin declared an end to the war on several occasions, large-scale military 
operations continued until 2009, and Chechen attacks on Russian civilian and military targets 
lasted even longer.67 In 2003, the Kremlin installed a former separatist-turned Putin supporter, 
Akhmat Kadyrov, as President of Chechnya. However, Kadyrov was quickly assassinated by 
radical Chechen rebels and replaced by his son Ramzan, a strongman who has ruled since then 
with a notorious iron-fist.68 All in all, as many as 200,000 Chechens, or over one-fifth of the total 
population, were killed in the two wars, while Chechen terror attacks on Russian soil have 
claimed thousands of Russian lives.69 As indicated, this paper examines the US print media 
coverage of six of those attacks, and thus it is prudent to provide some specific context and 
background for them. 
The first event selected for analysis was the September Apartment Bombings in the cities 
of Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk. On September 4, 1999, a truck packed with explosives 
was detonated outside of an apartment building housing military families in Buynaksk, Dagestan 
(a republic bordering Chechnya), this event marked the beginning of a wave of apartment 
bombings over the next two weeks.70 On September 9 and 13, two more bombs leveled 
apartment buildings in Moscow, killing over 150 people and inciting mass hysteria throughout 
the capital.71 Finally, on September 16, a truck bomb parked next to an apartment building in the 
Russian city of Volgodonsk was detonated.72 In total around 300 people were killed by the 
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attacks. Despite the fact that no party claimed responsibility, Russian officials were quick to 
blame Chechen separatists for the attacks. The bombings contributed to the dehumanization of 
Chechens in the Russian media and population, and served as the main motivator in garnering 
public support for the Second Russo-Chechen War.73 The sheer scale and significance of the 
attacks resulted in a large amount of media coverage and the location of the bombings in 
Moscow provided Western reporters with an ease of access in reporting the tragedies. 
The second event selected for analysis was the Moscow Underpass Bombing. On March 
8, 2000, a bomb exploded in a crowded pedestrian underpass adjacent to the famous Pushkin 
Square. The bomb killed seven and wounded dozens more. Again no responsibility was claimed 
but Russian officials again assigned blame for the explosion to Chechen rebels declaring it a 
“terrorist attack.”74 The bombing received much less coverage than the September attacks, but it 
still brought a new wave a anti-Chechen fervor to the Russian capital. 
The third and final pre-9/11 event selected for analysis was the Car Bombings in 
Southern Russia on March 24, 2001. Three simultaneous car bombs in the towns of Yessentuki 
and Mineralnye Vody, which targeted police stations and an open market, resulted in 21 deaths 
and over 100 people injured. The towns were located in the Stavropol region adjacent to 
Chechnya and blame was quickly thrust on Chechen rebels. Afterwards, Putin called for US 
officials to cancel a meeting with a Chechen representative.75 Although media coverage of the 
                                                 
73 Russell, “Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves”, 107-9. 
74 Daniel Williams, "Moscow Explosion Kills 8; Rush-Hour Bomb Detonates in Crowded Downtown Pedestrian 
Underpass." The Washington Post, Aug 09, 2000. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/408998826?accountid=14709; Daniel Williams, "Security in Moscow Tight 
After Bombing; Residents Organize Patrols, Reinforce Locks." The Washington Post, Aug 10, 2000. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/408653635?accountid=14709. 
75  Peter Baker, "Moscow Blames Rebels for Deadly Car Bombings Near Chechnya." The Washington Post, Mar 25, 
2001. http://search.proquest.com/docview/409098397?accountid=14709. 
 21 
event was modest, its temporal proximity to September 11, 2001 and its location in Southern 
Russia make the bombings an excellent event for comparison. 
The first post-9/11 event and the single most heavily covered attack selected for analysis 
was the Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis in Moscow. On October 23, 2002, during a showing of 
the popular musical “Nord-Ost,” roughly 50 heavily armed Chechen guerillas stormed a theater 
in Moscow, taking around 850 hostages and wiring the entire building with explosives.76 An 
almost three-day siege ensued; many negotiation attempts fell through, as the Chechens were 
demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. Russian security forces finally 
stormed the theater pumping a then-undisclosed gas into the theaters vents to knockout the 
hostage-takers and hostages alike.77 Although the rescue was originally deemed a great success, 
as the death toll began to rise domestic frustration arose over the government’s secrecy regarding 
the identity of the gas. Almost 130 hostages were killed in the crisis attempt, only two of them by 
the guerillas; the rest died as an adverse result of the gas.78 However, despite the large death toll, 
criticism both domestically and from Western governments was muted, as most voiced their 
support for Putin’s hardline response including US President George W. Bush and British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair.79 Western media coverage of the event was nearly unparalleled and 
connections were quickly drawn between the attack and those of 9/11.80 
The second post-9/11 event selected for analysis was the Moscow Metro Bombing in 
February 2004. On February 6th, a bomb detonated on a Moscow metro train as it traveled 
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between stations, killing 41 and injuring 120. President Putin quickly attributed the bombings to 
Chechen rebels, but the leadership of the separatist movement adamantly denied any 
involvement.81 Occurring at the end of a wave of terror attacks throughout the country, the event 
once again brought the Chechen conflict to the forefront of Russian discussions, and served to 
shake faith in the Russian government and police to keep its citizens safe. 
The final event selected was the Beslan School Hostage Crisis. On September 1, 2004, 
heavily armed Chechen guerillas seized a school amidst its first day celebrations and took over 
1,100 hostages (777 of them children). The separatists, numbering around forty, forced the 
hostages into the school’s gymnasium and laced the building with massive amounts of 
explosives.82 Tense negotiations took place over a three-day standoff, as the Chechens demanded 
the withdrawal of Russian troops but denied any offers of food or water for the child hostages.83 
Finally on the third day, gunfire and explosions broke out and chaos ensued as Russian security 
forces took on the hostage-takers. Although Russian officials claimed the fighting was initiated 
by the guerillas, many other groups including many of the Beslan parents placed the blame on 
Russian forces. In the end, about 380 people were killed, including 186 children.84 The failed 
rescue drew large amounts of domestic criticism, although sympathy for the victims was felt 
universally, including in the US.85 
Overall, these events serve to provide a comparison of the US print media reactions to 
Chechen terror attacks within Russia both before and after September 11th 2001. In the next 
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section, this paper will analyze that coverage with the three pre-9/11 events and seek to draw 
conclusions about the frames of representation presented by the different publications for the 
events. 
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2.0  ANALYSIS OF PUBLICATIONS PRE-9/11 
This study seeks to identify and highlight eight major frames of representation that appear 
frequently within the print media coverage in order to analyze the shifting perspectives provided 
by the media outlets before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001. These eight frames are 
grouped into four dichotomous pairs so as to better analyze a major shift in representation. 
Before analyzing these frames within the context of the articles, it is prudent to explain each of 
the pairs of frames themselves, what they constitute, how they were identified in the texts, and 
what significance they represent.86 
The first pair of frames identified in the analysis denotes the descriptive labels used by 
the media sources to refer to the Chechen attackers in their coverage of the events. In some 
cases, the attackers are identified as rebels, guerillas, separatists, or hostage-takers, while in other 
cases the label of “terrorists” is used. As such, the first two frames of representation in this 
analysis are: “Chechen attackers as separatists” (this frame is meant to encompass all four of the 
terms mentioned in the first part of the above comparison) and “Chechen attackers as terrorists”. 
In identifying these frames of representation, this author carefully analyzed each of the articles 
for every event that specifically referred to the attackers (this included almost every article) and 
took careful note of which labels were used by the three newspapers in each case. In some cases, 
a mix of labels occurred in a single article, but due to the significance of “terrorist” as an 
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identifier, it almost always dominated the rhetoric in these situations. Although this distinction in 
labeling may seem insignificant given the nature of the attacks themselves, the impact that 
labeling can have on consumers’ perceptions of an external event is deceivingly important. 
As discussed previously, the power of language in shaping a reader’s perception is 
substantial and plays a large part in how readers identify themselves and the social reality 
surrounding them.87 Thus, the way that actors in events are labeled deeply affects the ways in 
which media consumers perceive and react to those actors and their actions. Herein lies the 
trouble with the label of “terrorist”, a word that inherently carries a prevailing and powerful 
stigma, but is used inconsistently by media publications and government officials. Despite its 
rise in popularity in recent decades, terrorism continues to escape any sort of unanimous 
definition. In fact, hundreds of different definitions exist, making the usage of the word as a label 
both unclear and dangerous.88 This difficulty in identifying “terrorists” has been well 
acknowledged by the media and has sparked much debate, but as of yet clarification of the 
term’s definition in the media remains illusory.89 The danger of this inconsistent and unclear use 
of “terrorist” is in the pre-attached value that the term carries and the influence of that value over 
consumer reaction.  
In the eyes of most media consumers, terrorism is a word that denotes evil in its most 
horrible form. Thus, the perpetrators of terrorism or “terrorists” are not only evil and immoral, 
but also mad, beyond reconciliation, and thus incapable of understanding or negotiating with.90 
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While the acts committed by those labeled “terrorists” are almost always heinous and 
unjustifiable, the effect of the label itself serves to bury any deeper political, historical, or 
cultural narrative that lies behind the actions of the perpetrators. Terrorism is often painted as a 
spontaneous phenomenon, the plague of the 21st century, but this perception masks any potential 
contextualization of terrorist attacks that could provide a better understanding of why the 
phenomenon occurs. In reality, “terrorism is the manifestation of more deeply engrained 
problems that affect society, such as political, economic, religious or social inequalities.”91 
However, when governments or media sources use the term loosely, they limit the ways in which 
the public can react to such actors. Because many assume that one cannot negotiate with 
terrorists, the label instantly delegitimizes any potential legitimate reason for their actions and 
relegates the discussion of such causes outside of the accepted mainstream discourse.92 
Additionally, the label often blurs the distinctions between those who commit the attacks and 
those whom they claim to represent.93 In these ways, the “terrorist” label may only serve to 
prolong a conflict as it prevents a full understanding of the root causes of the dispute, and 
diminishes any chance for an effective and lasting peaceful solution.  
The risk of such reckless labeling within the framing of the Russo-Chechen conflict is 
apparent. Russian officials had long used the label of “terrorists” in referring to Chechen rebels 
in an attempt to gain Western support; however, it was not until after the attacks of September 
11th that Western governments acknowledged any legitimacy to these claims.94 As a result, little 
pressure was put on the Russian government after September 11th to find a political solution to 
the problem and, unsurprisingly, the “humanitarian disaster” that was the Second Russo-Chechen 
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War was allowed to continue.95 Additionally, the Russian leadership’s ignorance of the historical 
and political roots of the Russo-Chechen conflict had the effect of pushing more Chechens 
toward an extreme stance in the face of perceived injustice, turning Putin’s counterterrorist 
operation into a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”96 It is for these reasons that an analysis of the labeling 
used by US print media in regard to Chechen attackers is of great importance. 
The second pair of frames of representation identified in this analysis centers on the way 
in which the media publications create a relatable and personal narrative of the victims. Media 
coverage of events is typically thought of as being dispassionate, a simple presentation of the 
facts that are left to the reader to interpret. However, in many cases, these facts are 
contextualized with in-depth scene setting and personal presentations of victims. Due to the 
potential power of this type of personal coverage, the third and fourth frames of representation 
studied in this analysis are: “personal depiction of victims” and “impersonal depiction of 
victims.” In identifying these frames, this author carefully and repeatedly analyzed the quantity 
and specificity of the victims’ details, backgrounds and personal experiences provided in the 
publications. In this way, it was possible to identify which articles in the three newspapers 
created a more relatable and intimate representation of the victims. Additionally, this author took 
careful note of which groups in particular receive this intimate coverage as victims. 
A more personal and specific representation allows the consumer to relate and empathize 
with the victims, thus drawing a much different and more lasting reaction to reporting than the 
mere presentation of the facts.97 As described by Susan Moeller, “when the coverage does 
introduce us to people identified by names and personal characteristics, the event becomes more 
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accessible,” allowing readers a chance to connect with those depicted and imagine their 
experience.98 Thus the level of detail attributed to the plight of the victims in a given event can 
exert a powerful influence over how readers’ sympathize with and thus react to the event. After 
the attacks of September 11th, many US publications, like the New York Times, utilized this type 
of reporting to present a more in-depth image to readers.99 For these reasons, understanding the 
different ways in which the media publications present victims is relevant for this analysis. 
The third pair of frames of representation identified in this analysis relates to the 
particular points of view represented within the media coverage of each event. Point-of-view 
(POV) is essential in providing a reader with an understanding of the perspectives belonging to 
both sides of any conflict. However, in many cases the explicit presentation of POVs provided 
by media coverage are either lacking (usually for one side) or nonexistent. This can result in 
readers failing to understand the full story behind a conflict and, as a result, responding to it in a 
partially informed or uninformed manner. Due to this risk, the fifth and sixth frames of 
representation in this analysis are: “Chechen POV” and “Russian POV”.100 In order to identify 
these frames, this author carefully read each of the articles and identified the different viewpoints 
provided by each publication in their coverage of the events. Ideally, the coverage should 
represent both viewpoints equally, leaving further judgment up to the reader, but in many cases 
the coverage favored one POV over the other. 
The justification for an analysis of POVs is quite obvious, as a perspective that is 
unrepresented in the interpretation of an event created by the media may be overlooked by the 
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public. Without a proper understanding of the full nature of a conflict, media consumers are 
doomed to draw incomplete, and possibly incorrect conclusions and reactions. The party whose 
POV goes unrepresented may turn to violence as the only method they perceive possible in order 
to escape a system they believe is unjust.101 In the case of the Russo-Chechen conflict, a failure 
to represent the Chechen POV may lead US public opinion to a misunderstanding in regards to 
the political nature and historical background of the dispute. As such, a comparison of the POVs 
represented by the US print media in regards to the Russo-Chechen conflict is essential. 
The final pair of frames of representation identified in this analysis is concerned with the 
greater context within which the publications place each event. Contextualization is important in 
providing readers with an understanding of the wider conflict outside of the specific event. Thus, 
different contexts can induce very different perceptions of the nature of a conflict. The two most 
common contexts presented in the analysis was one that highlighted the historical and cultural 
aspects of the Russo-Chechen conflict (including previous/current wars and disputes) and one 
that highlighted previous terror attacks (both domestically and internationally) and placed the 
event within a timeline of these attacks. As a result the seventh and eighth frames of 
representation identified in this analysis are: “Context of historical conflict” and “Context of 
wave of terror”. In identifying these frames, this author carefully analyzed each article that 
included a wider contextualization of the conflict in order to pinpoint the dominant narrative 
illustrated by the background details provided by the publications. In some cases, the articles 
synthesized both contexts crafting a more balanced picture of the conflict, but more often only 
one set of circumstances was included. 
                                                 
101 Russell, “Mujahedeen, Mafia, Madmen”, 77. 
 30 
The dangers of a limited contextualization of a particular event are similar to those 
associated with the label of “terrorist” in that they both risk burying the greater historical and 
political origins inherent in the conflict. The “context of a wave of terror” is incomplete and 
paints a narrative that ignores these important aspects. Resolving a conflict is highly unlikely in a 
situation that ignores the dispute’s root causes and a misunderstanding may serve to push the 
conflict even further from resolution. Additionally, this context also links the Russo-Chechen 
conflict to the wider US-declared ‘Global War on Terror’. This type of relationship creates a 
sympathetic perspective to Russia’s struggle with Chechnya and thus is relevant for analysis. 
 In the case of the pre-9/11 attacks, the coverage of all three events from each publication 
will be analyzed as a group for two main reasons. Firstly, by combining the articles for each 
event into one unit, this author was better able to examine the frames of representation that 
appear repeatedly and consistently in the coverage, a task which would have been much more 
difficult separately due to the markedly smaller coverage surrounding the pre-9/11 events. 
Secondly, the homogenous nature of the frames of representation identified in the coverage of 
the pre-9/11 events renders an individual examination of each event unnecessary, even if some of 
the details of the three events are lost.  
 
2.1 THE NEW YORK TIMES 
The New York Times coverage over the course of the three pre-9/11 events follows a thematic 
narrative and incorporates a consistent combination of specific frames of representation. These 
frames are demonstrative of the reality of the Chechen conflict that the Times created for its 
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readers from September 1999 to September 2001, and thus illustrate the picture of the conflict 
that many readers of the Times internalized. In order to highlight and discuss these dominant 
frames of representation, this author has incorporated direct examples from the coverage of the 
events. 
The first identifiable frame of representation within the New York Times’ coverage of the 
pre-9/11 events is “Chechen attackers as separatists.” The dominant labels used for Chechens 
within this coverage are rebel, guerilla, and militant: all of which connote a two-sided war rather 
than the charged one-sidedness often associated with the label of “terrorist.” For example, in an 
article about the September Apartment Bombings, the Times describes, “their investigation… 
found that Chechen militants had shipped tons of explosives into Moscow disguised as bags of 
sugar.”102 Although these explosives were being used to blatantly target civilians in Moscow, the 
Chechens are not labeled as terrorists, but rather as militants. Another example from the same 
article states, “reports… had indicated the rebels planned to attack not only Moscow, but also 
Rostov and St. Petersburg.”103 Again, although the article is reporting on attacks on civilians, the 
perpetrators are referred to as rebels. Words like “rebels” and “militants” inspire a context of war 
within the imagination of the reader, as opposed to “terrorists” which creates an image of random 
and unexplainable killing. Further, references in the Times reporting to Russian officials blaming 
the attacks on “Chechen rebels” and claiming the killings were “linked… to Chechen militants” 
provide readers with additional perspective on the conflict.104 Not only do these terms imply a 
political context for the attacks, but they also attribute a national identity to the attackers, making 
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it clear that what is occurring is not a wave of random terror, but the manifestation of an ongoing 
nationalist war for independence. 
The use of the label of “terrorist” in reference to the pre-9/11 attacks is exclusively 
reserved for when the publication directly quotes or refers to statements made by Russian 
officials, and it often describes the nature of the violence instead of the perpetrators. For 
example, in an article addressing the Moscow Underpass Bombing the Times quotes the Mayor 
of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov: “Luzhkov described the explosion, … as a ‘terrorist act’ with a 
‘Chechen trace.’”105 In this way, the Times distances itself from the term and additionally applies 
a sense of skepticism to the validity of the Mayor’s claims. Another example of this can be seen 
in an article referring to the September Apartment Bombings: “officials say are terrorist attacks, 
attributed to Islamic guerilla leaders.”106 In this quote, the Times separates its own voice from 
both the attribution of blame to the guerillas and from the use of “terrorist,” thus portraying to 
the reader that these claims may be part of the information war around the conflict and ought to 
be taken with a grain of salt. A final effective representation of the Times labeling appears in the 
coverage of the Southern Russia Car Bombings. In one article, the Times uses the phrase 
“terrorist acts” on four different occasions, but only from the objective safety of direct quotations 
of Russian officials; the publication itself otherwise refers to the Chechens as “rebels.”107 This 
report came just one day after Russian President Putin had protested to the European Union for 
its refusal to refer to the Chechens as terrorists.108 The reality projected by the New York Times’ 
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labeling of the Chechens in the pre-9/11 events provided viewers with a perspective of war and 
secession rather than of groundless terror. 
A second dominant frame of representation notable within the Times’ pre-9/11 coverage 
is the “impersonal depiction of victims”. Although it is difficult to provide evidence of what the 
Times did not include in the coverage (i.e. specificities regarding the victims’ experience and 
background), some cases still represent the overall detached mood of the coverage. For example, 
in an article referring to the victims of the September Apartment Bombings, the Times notes only 
that, “women and children were among the casualties.”109 The use of the label “casualties” even 
when referring to the deaths of innocent women and children makes clear the impersonal and 
detached nature of the Times coverage. Additionally within the article, as with many others in the 
pre-9/11 coverage, no interviews with victims or their perspective is provided, as the Times 
instead focuses more attention to the political context and repercussions of the attacks.110  
However, despite the predominantly impersonalized coverage, several articles from the 
Times do include brief glimpses into the victims’ experiences. An excellent example of this can 
be seen in the Times coverage of the Moscow Underpass Bombing in which an article provides 
several personal relations of the explosions including interviews and graphic descriptions of the 
victims, “some of them streaming blood from shrapnel… others limping with shredded 
clothing.”111 These types of depictions create a more sympathetic and relatable representation for 
consumers, as they humanize the victims in ways that the attackers are not. Nevertheless, within 
the pre-9/11 coverage, the majority of detached articles overshadows the personal frame. In fact, 
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the article that provides the most specific personal background and experience in the pre-9/11 
coverage does not focus on the victims of the attacks at all. Instead, the article describes the 
backlash and harassment against Chechens in Moscow after the September Apartment 
Bombings, focusing on the victimization of the Chechens. The article, one of the longest in the 
Times pre-9/11 coverage, traces the story of a Chechen woman and her family from their 
flattened home in Grozny, the Chechen capital, to their emigration to Moscow where “they suffer 
from a constant fear of eviction.”112 This personal coverage of the Chechen experience represents 
a balance to the coverage of the Russian victims and allows readers to relate to both Chechen and 
Russian victims of the conflict. This personalization and humanization of the actors within the 
events affects the ways in which media consumers perceive and react to the actors’ experiences 
and actions. 
Another identifiable attribute of the Times coverage in the pre-9/11 era is its balanced 
presentation of the “Chechen POV” and the “Russia POV”. In many of the articles regarding the 
September Apartment Bombings, the Times is sure to present not only the perspective of the 
victims of the attacks, but also the effects of the attacks on Chechens as well. For example, one 
article depicts the fears of Russian Muscovites in exceptional detail with several interviews 
highlighting the pervasive fear and suffering throughout the city. However, the Times balances 
this coverage by also acknowledging the persecution being felt by Chechen citizens in the city, 
some of whom “said they did not dare go outside,” for fear of oppression at the hands of the 
Russian authorities.113 Thus, the frame described by the Times is one of an ongoing and complex 
conflict in which the violence hurts Chechens as well as Russians, albeit in different ways. This 
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contrasting presentation of POVs is also present in several other articles as well. The coverage 
shifts from relating the “new sense of vulnerability” caused by the attacks in Moscow to 
explaining the crackdowns on Chechens as “extensive, so extensive that it is prompting concerns 
by human rights organizations.”114 In this way, the Times provides a more complete picture of 
the conflict to consumers, one that encompasses the fear and suffering on both sides of the 
violence.  
The Times’ balanced coverage of the victims of the conflict is best exemplified in two 
articles from the September Apartment Bombings. The first, as previously mentioned, is a long 
descriptive article devoted to the scapegoating of Chechens after the bombings. This article, with 
its illustrative depiction of the indiscriminate tactics used by the Russian police, represents an 
attempt by the Times to balance its victimization and perspective given to the Russians with the 
comparable experiences of Chechen civilians.115 The second article, an editorial, provides a 
direct view into the outlook of the Times itself and the sympathy felt by the publication toward 
the entirety of the conflict’s victims. The editorial begins by describing the harsh nature of the 
bombings and acknowledging that, “The fear and anger in Russia are understandable.” However, 
the focus of the piece quickly shifts, as most of the article is devoted to a condemnation of the 
Moscow police for “arresting and detaining the innocent” and “bursting into homes… by 
nationality.”116 Thus, despite the obvious victims of the bombings being Russians, the Times 
coverage of the pre-9/11 events is careful to preserve a balanced and objective consistency of 
POVs. 
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The final frame that dominates the pre-9/11 coverage of the New York Times is the 
“context of historical conflict.” In placing the events within a greater context, the Times coverage 
consistently refers to historical interactions and situates the attacks within the ongoing war in 
Chechnya. For example, an article regarding the September Apartment Bombings begins by 
describing the attacks as “a wave of random violence,” but quickly supplements this statement 
with the important context of the “Chechen militants ongoing war with the Russian army.”117 
Another article describes in detail the fighting in the Caucasus, citing the attacks in Russia as 
“the war (was) being fought on several fronts.”118 The context given to the reader by these 
articles places the attacks within the understandable violent back-and-forth of modern warfare, 
despite the fact that civilians were directly targeted. The importance of this is that the war retains 
a political identity and logical goal for its fighters. Instead of being purposeless murderers, the 
Chechens are separatists fighting, albeit with indiscriminate tactics, for their independence. 
Other articles delve into even greater historical context in constructing the narrative of 
the conflict for consumers. For example, one article describes not only the destruction caused by 
the First Russo-Chechen War in Grozny, but even refers to the roots of the conflict in Stalin’s 
1944 deportation of the Chechen people.119 This serves to position the new outbreaks of violence 
in the conflict within a greater timeline of nationalist disputes so as to provide the reader with a 
greater political understanding of the conflict’s main issues. A final pertinent example of the 
Times shunning of the “context of wave of terror” frame of representation in favor of the 
“context of historical conflict” is visible in an article covering the Moscow Underpass Bombing. 
The article contrasts a direct quote from Russian President Putin stating, “terrorism was an 
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‘international illness’” with deeper historical background highlighting, “two rebellions and two 
devastating invasions by the Russian military” in Chechnya.120 Clearly the priority in the 
contextualization provided by the Times was focused on creating a representation of an ongoing 
and historical conflict. 
Overall, five main frames of representation dominated the New York Times coverage of 
the three pre-9/11 events. The consistent combination of the “Chechen attackers as separatists”, 
“impersonal depiction of victims”, equal representation of the “Chechen POV” and “Russian 
POV,” and heavy favoritism toward a “context of historical conflict” offers the Times’ readers 
with an interpretation of the conflict that is characterized by historical disputes, an ongoing 
separatist war, and innocent suffering on both sides. This depiction stands in stark contrast to the 
Times coverage of events in the post-9/11 era, which this author will further address in Section 
3.1.  
 
2.2 THE WASHINGTON POST 
Much like the New York Times, the coverage provided by the Washington Post consists of a 
repetitive yet distinct combination of frames of representation that serve to provide the Post’s 
readers with a particular perspective on the nature of the Russo-Chechen conflict. This in turn 
influenced the way in which readers related to and responded to the events in Russia before 
September 11, 2001. In order to ensure the validity of the following observations and present a 
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more detailed and complete picture of the Post’s coverage, this author has again utilized specific 
examples from the coverage itself. 
The first notable frame of representation within the Washington Post’s pre-9/11 coverage 
is “Chechen attackers as separatists.” As in the Times coverage, Chechens discussed in the pre-
9/11 coverage are typically referred to using various terms including rebels, separatists, and 
guerillas. In an article about the September Apartment bombings, the Post describes those being 
blamed as “guerillas from Chechnya” and proceeds to use the label of “guerilla” throughout the 
remainder of the article.121 Another article on the bombings states, “Russian leaders have 
accused separatist rebels… of Chechnya of organizing the attacks.”122 Both of these labels imply 
that those being referred to are participants in a war, presumably for independence, and thus their 
actions are part of that war. This implication lends legitimacy to the actions and the apparent 
political cause championed by the attackers that is not otherwise attributed by labels such as 
“terrorist”. The most dominant label applied throughout the entirety of the coverage however is 
that of “Chechen rebels”.123 Not only does this imply that the rebels are championing a specific 
and stated political goal, it also clearly implies that the motivation behind that goal is nationalist 
self-determination, a concept that most media consumers are familiar with and can understand. 
Additionally, the label of “terrorist” is almost exclusively used in quotations or in 
reference to the nature of the attacks rather than the identification of those blamed for them. A 
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very representative example of this policy can be seen in the Post’s coverage of the Southern 
Russia Car Bombs. In reference to a meeting between a US State department official and a 
Chechen delegate, the Post explains that Russian officials declared that the US had “received an 
emissary from terrorists with the ‘blood of civilians on their hands.’” However, the Post 
contrasts this quote with its own depiction of the delegate as “a representative of Chechen 
rebels.”124 The distinction between these two identities reveals the differing views toward the 
Chechens held by Russian officials and the editorial staff of the Post. This view is then passed on 
to the readers, who are presented with an image of the Chechen separatists of which Russian 
officials disapprove. Another example of this careful labeling can be seen in an article regarding 
the Moscow Underpass Bombing. In this case, “Chechen ‘terrorists’” were “quickly labeled” by 
Russian officials as the cause of the attack.125 This not only distances the Post from the claims 
made by Russian officials, but also represents skepticism of the validity of the claims in the first 
place. Overall, the Post’s labeling of Chechens in the pre-9/11 events preserves the political and 
national identity of the attackers, implying an environment of war between two legitimate parties 
rather than of one-sided acts of random violence. 
A second dominant frame of representation common to the pre-9/11 coverage of the 
Washington Post is the “impersonal depiction of victims.” What is striking about the Post’s 
creation of this frame is not what is included in the articles, but what is not. Even more detached 
than the mostly impersonal coverage of the New York Times, the Washington Post’s pre-9/11 
articles are almost entirely devoid of any information regarding the backgrounds and experiences 
of victims. In most of the articles, the full extent of the coverage of victims consists of a sentence 
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stating the number of dead and wounded. For example, in an article covering one of the 
September Apartment Bombings in Moscow, the Post states, “the blast… killed 40 people and 
injured 152 others, but dozens more were believed to be buried under the rubble.”126 This is the 
only information regarding victims that is provided, with the exception of a later statement 
clarifying that “some of the casualties were in a neighboring building.”127 This coverage reduces 
any personal or sympathetic experience that might be drawn from the coverage, simply 
presenting the reader with the facts of the event.  
The only interviews and specific information regarding victims to occur in the pre-9/11 
coverage are within two articles covering the Moscow Underpass Bombing in 2000.128 The 
accounts provided are brief, numbering a few sentences at most. They provide very minimal 
insight into the scene of the bombing, as opposed to the lengthy interviews conducted by the 
Times. Despite the fact that the September Apartment Bombings had also occurred in Moscow 
just a year earlier and caused much more devastation, no such interviews or background were 
provided on those events. This distant style of reporting provides Post readers with a very 
detached view of the attacks. The actors–both attackers and victims–are faceless and devoid of 
any personality or history. No explicit sympathy is expressed for either side, leaving the reader to 
draw conclusions for themselves about how to judge and react to the event. By refraining from 
humanizing or personalizing the victims, the Post also avoids the implicit creation of a villain. 129 
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Although this frame of representation is dominant in much of the pre-9/11 discourse, it is much 
less prevalent in the later coverage of the publications. 
While the New York Times seems to seek a balance in its presentation of points of view, 
the Washington Post mostly attempts to mitigate this challenge by refusing to present the conflict 
through either side’s perspective. In the vast majority of articles, the Post takes the position of an 
objective observer. Rather than present the particular grievances of either party, the Post uses 
brief statements by officials on both sides and the reactions of experts to the events to provide a 
depiction of the conflict from a comfortable distance. For example, an article covering the 
September Apartment Bombings provides the typical format of the Post’s pre-9/11 coverage. 
The article opens with a brief description of the bombing and of the public responses by Russian 
law enforcement and officials. Next, it provides context on the war in Chechnya, and reports 
experts’ reflections on the potential impact of the event.130 By avoiding spokesmen for either 
side, the Post attempts to remove any potential bias and leave interpretation to the reader.  
In the few pre-9/11 cases in which the Post does provide a particular point of view, it 
tends to present a balance of both the “Chechen POV” and “Russian POV.” For example, an 
article referring to the apartment bombing in Volgodonsk describes the paranoid and “unnerved” 
reactions among Russian citizens after the attack instilled a sense of pervasive vulnerability. 
However, this POV is quickly countered with a short section highlighting the “constant 
questioning and police checks” that created a similar sentiment amongst Chechens.131 In this 
way, the amount of POV presented in the Washington Post’s coverage is measured and balanced. 
Readers do not have a standing of the conflict imposed upon them through the provided 
viewpoints, although other frames of representation may still influence readers’ responses. 
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The final dominant frame of representation present within the pre-9/11 coverage of the 
Washington Post is the “context of historical conflict”. By far the dominant narrative promoted 
by the Post’s articles is one that places the contemporary attacks in the context of a long and 
complex historical conflict. For example, in an article addressing the Moscow Underpass 
Bombing, the post states, “Chechnya has been ravaged by Russian bombs and artillery; its 
capital… has been nearly leveled; and tens of thousands of civilians have been driven from their 
homes. Yet the war persists, with Chechens carrying out frequent hit-and run-attacks.”132 This 
type of contextualization for the bombing provides news consumers with the impression that the 
attack is simply another act of war in a long and brutal conflict for both sides. Other articles take 
a more specific historical approach, describing the context of the First Russo-Chechen War and 
the uneasy ceasefire that led up to the current conflict.133 In this way, the attacks on Russian soil 
are depicted not as isolated acts of terror, but as manifestations of the fundamental historical 
conflict that remained dormant during a brief period of peace. Readers of the Post are provided 
with a view that encompasses these political, economic and social problems rather than one that 
attributes the events to the plague of international terrorism. 
Overall, the Washington Post’s coverage of the three pre-9/11 events utilizes these 
frames of representation in order to construct an interpretation of the Russo-Chechen conflict 
that encompasses greater historical and political issues within the dispute. Additionally, the 
careful and distant reporting of the Post ensures that a level of agency in interpreting the conflict 
remains with the reader, a phenomenon that becomes much less common after the September 
11th attacks.  
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2.3 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
Despite having a significantly smaller amount of pre-9/11 coverage than the other publications, 
the Wall Street Journal’s presentation of events is characterized by a consistent arrangement of 
frames of representation. These frames, through their repetition and dominance, create a coherent 
narrative that defines the reality of the pre-9/11 conflict for the readers of the Journal. In order to 
effectively illustrate the authority attributed to these specific frames within the Journal’s 
coverage, this author has selected specific examples from the articles that best illustrate the 
thematic consistency of coverage as a whole. 
The first prominent frame of representation that is applied consistently in the Wall Street 
Journal’s discourse is the “Chechens attackers as separatists” frame. Throughout the Journal’s 
presentation of events, the most common labels applied to the Chechen attackers are militants 
and rebels. These terms denote the attackers as legitimate actors representative of a state of war 
in which violence is expected. For example, in articles about the Moscow Underpass Bombing 
and Southern Russia Car Bombs, the Journal describes how “suspicion fell on Chechen rebels” 
and “Moscow blamed Chechen rebels.”134 Not only do these statements distance the publication 
from the accusations made by Russian officials, they also provide the reader with a specific 
understanding of the conflict. The use of “rebels” implies that the fighters are championing a 
specific and explicit cause, independence, which is much different from the implications inherent 
in other labels like “terrorists”. Additionally, by emphasizing the national character of the 
attackers, the Journal has made clear that the roots of the conflict are ones of nationalism and 
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identity, both of which are common and recognized causes of dispute in modern times. In this 
way, the Journal provides its consumers with a sense that the specific events about which they 
are reading are neither isolated nor random, but rather part of a larger narrative characterized by 
a dispute over national self-determination. 
Further, the only uses of the term “terrorist” in the Journal’s pre-9/11 articles are in 
reference to the nature of the bombings themselves. While the Journal freely describes the 
September Apartment Bombings as “suspected terrorist bombings” or a “suspected terrorist 
explosion,” those who allegedly carried out these attacks are referred to in both cases as 
“militants” from Chechnya.135 Thus, the Journal does not use “terrorist” as an identifier or label, 
but as a description of a tactic exhibited by a warring party. This distinction, coupled with the 
presentation of an ongoing asymmetrical conflict, creates an image of the attackers and their 
actions that is understandable and relatable rather than unapproachable. Overall, the 
identification of the Chechen attackers supplied by the Journal serves to reinforce the context of 
ongoing and legitimate conflict in the pre-9/11 period. 
A second recognizable frame of representation that is heavily present in the Wall Street 
Journal’s coverage is the “impersonal depiction of victims.” The Wall Street Journal’s 
presentation of the pre-9/11 attacks is by far the most detached and neutral of the three 
publications. Nowhere in its coverage does the Journal not deliver one instance of coverage that 
provides any background, experiential, or personal information regarding victims on either side 
of the conflict. This is a bit surprising, given the fact that the Journal has maintained a foreign 
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bureau in Moscow (the site of several of the bombings) since 1993.136 For example, an article 
covering one of the September Apartment Bombings in Moscow mentions the victims of the 
attack just once, stating, “The latest explosion reduced an eight-story building in Southern 
Moscow to rubble… killing at least 73 people.”137 This lack of attention to the victims of the 
attacks, whether the result of journalistic objectivity or a more overt focus on political and 
economic issues, characterizes the Journal’s coverage throughout the pre-9/11 events. As such, 
readers of the Journal’s coverage receive an objective, albeit impersonal representation of the 
conflict that requires them to imagine and judge the events themselves. 
A third noteworthy aspect of the Wall Street Journal’s pre-9/11 coverage is the small 
amount of and balanced presentation of both the “Russian POV” and “Chechen POV.” The vast 
majority of the coverage avoids either of the points of view, choosing instead to focus on the 
political and economic repercussions of the attacks. For example, an article regarding the 
September Apartment Bombings spends as much text covering how the explosion “rocked 
Russian markets” as it does discussing the nature of the bombing itself.138 However, on the very 
rare occasion that the Journal does address the specific perspectives within the conflict, the 
outlooks are typically measured and balanced. An article from the Journal’s September 
Apartment Bombing coverage describes the aftermath of the bombings in which public sentiment 
called for military action to protect Russia from further attacks. Juxtaposed to this reporting is a 
description of the destruction brought about by Russian military strikes in Chechnya, “which left 
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200 civilians dead.”139 In this way, the limited coverage of victims in the Wall Street Journal’s 
coverage provides the audience with a more balanced representation of the views in the conflict. 
The final thematic frame of representation present within the Wall Street Journal’s 
coverage of the pre-9/11 events is the “context of historical conflict”. In the pre-9/11 period, the 
Journal’s reporting consistently places the attacks within a context of ongoing and continuous 
warfare. For example, in a description of the September Apartment Bombings, the bombings are 
labeled as “rebel attacks,” giving the impression of a military operation rather than a terrorist 
assault.140 Further, another article begins with an explanation of the end of the First Russo-
Chechen War and describes the current conflict as a continuation of that dispute over 
independence.141 This type of contextualization provides readers of the Journal with an 
understanding of the contemporary attacks as a manifestation of an ongoing conflict over 
established and legitimate goals. However in one case the Journal does seem to present a 
“context of wave of terror,” but this is countered in the text by the inclusion of the war context as 
well. The article, which reports on the Southern Russia Car Bombs, describes the bombings as 
part of a “terrorist campaign in the North Caucasus,” a description which would paint a very 
different picture if it were not accompanied by a description of Russia’s “protracted guerilla war 
in the southern region of Chechnya.”142 The combination of these two descriptions provides the 
reader with a context in which terror has become a tactic of a long-term separatist war. Overall, 
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the context established by the coverage of the Wall Street Journal provides its readers with an 
understanding of the historical and political nature of the conflict.  
Through its use of specific language and context, the Wall Street Journal creates a 
thematic representation of the pre-9/11 events that is the result of an increasingly brutal ongoing 
separatist war. Additionally, the impersonal and detached nature of the Journal’s coverage 
creates a sense of objectivity towards the conflict that leaves much up to the reader’s 




3.0  POST-9/11 ANALYSIS: 
The following discussion of the post-9/11 events differs from the previous discussion in that the 
analysis will be separated not only by newspaper, but also by event. This reflects the massive 
increase in media coverage after 9/11, as well as the continued shift in the style of coverage from 
2001-2004. Additionally, the themes conveyed in each newspaper will not only be compared to 
each other, but also to the patterns of coverage identified from the pre-9/11 events. The purpose 
of this organization is to enable this author to draw measured conclusions about the impact of the 
experience of the September 11th attacks on the publications reactions to attacks within Russia.  
3.1 DUBROVKA THEATER HOSTAGE CRISIS 
On October 23, 2003, around 50 heavily armed Chechen militants seized a theater in the 
Dubrovka neighborhood of Moscow, taking about 850 hostages just three miles southwest of the 
Kremlin.143 After an almost three-day siege including many negotiation attempts, Russian 
security forces finally stormed the bomb-laden theater pumping a then-undisclosed gas into the 
theater’s vents to knockout the hostage-takers and hostages alike.144 Although the rescue was 
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initially deemed a success, as the death toll rose to over 100, criticism emerged toward the 
government’s secrecy about the gas. In the end, almost 130 hostages were killed in the rescue 
attempt, only two of them by the guerillas and the rest as an adverse result of the gas.145 Despite 
the large death toll, criticism remained muted from both the Russian public and from Western 
governments, as most citizens and leaders voiced support for Putin’s hardline response to the 
attack including US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.146  
The Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis remains one of the most infamous and heavily 
reported events in the history of the Russo-Chechen conflict. As such, the US media coverage 
attached to the event is both extensive and thorough. In accurately identifying the patterns of 
frames of representation created by the publications in their coverage, this author carefully and 
analytically reviewed each article several times. Additionally, so as to ensure the validity and 
accuracy of the conclusions drawn from this work, this author has utilized direct quotations and 
references to each newspapers article base in presenting these patterns. 
3.1.1 THE NEW YORK TIMES 
The New York Times coverage of the Dubrovka Hostage Crisis differs greatly from the paper’s 
pre-9/11 coverage not only in the magnitude of coverage, but also in the themes through which 
the conflict, and the attack’s place in it, is represented. This is characterized by a dominant 
discourse that differs notably from the frames of representation found in the earlier coverage. As 
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a result, readers in the post-9/11 era are given a much different perspective into the Russo-
Chechen conflict than provided in the past.  
The first and one of the most noticeable shifts in the coverage is the rise of the “Chechen 
attackers as terrorists” frame of representation and a concomitant decrease of the “Chechen 
attackers as separatists” frame. Although the Times’ pre-9/11 coverage is characterized by a 
systematic avoidance of the use of “terrorist” when referring to the Chechens, this restraint is not 
evident in the Times’ post-9/11 coverage. In the very first article about the Dubrovka Crisis, the 
assault on the theater is described as beginning “when a group of between 40 and 50 Chechen 
terrorists, …stormed the theater.”147 This represents a clear departure from the cautious and 
controlled labeling of the earlier events and serves to paint the Chechens not as actors in an 
ongoing war, but as “terrorists.”  
Further, not only is this frame of representation used much more loosely in the Dubrovka 
Crisis coverage, but it also becomes the dominant label through which the attackers are 
identified. Although other terms like “guerilla” and “militant” still appear occasionally in the 
articles, “terrorist” replaces them as the most common and by far the most significant label.148 
This rhetorical change deprives the attackers of rationality or political motivations. For example, 
in one article regarding the experience of hostages inside the theater, the attackers are referred to 
exclusively as “terrorists” with no other qualifying description.149 Although the absence of other 
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labels or details may seem inconsequential, it serves to entirely dehumanize the attackers and 
remove any rational motive for their actions. Without terms like “separatist,” “rebel,” or even 
“Chechen,” the true nationalist roots of the Russo-Chechen conflict are dismissed by the use of 
the blanket term “terrorism.” As “terrorists” the Chechens are no longer representative of an 
ongoing nationalist dispute and are instead part of a new, evil global phenomenon. Readers of 
this type of presentation come to understand the violence in the events not as a manifestation of 
oppressed nationalist ambitions, but as an irrational act of random violence and unexplainable 
hate. In contrast to the understanding of the conflict fostered by the pre-9/11 coverage, readers of 
the Dubrovka Crisis coverage receive an incomplete and partial representation of the ongoing 
conflict.  
Although the Times’ coverage marks a shift to a less judicious use of “terrorists” as a 
label, a smaller proportion of the coverage, almost of all of which is attributable to one reporter, 
still retains the careful identifications that characterized its earlier coverage. Although these few 
articles continue to only use “terrorist” in reference to quotes made by officials, the open use of 
the term in the rest of coverage hinders the effect of this prudency. A telling example of the 
prevalence of the label appears in one of the commentary pieces on the event published by the 
Times. The piece provides an accurate history of the violence of the conflict, highlighting the 
death and destruction caused by the Russo-Chechen Wars and the oppressed nationalist 
aspirations of the Chechen people. However, even in this article, which presents one of the most 
personal and detailed views of the Chechen cause within the coverage, the author still refers to 
the attackers as “heavily armed terrorists.”150 This exemplifies the pervasive nature of the label 
in the Dubrovka Crisis coverage and illustrates the acceptance and authority of the term as 
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appropriate discourse to describe the event. However, new labels such as “gunmen” and 
“hostage-takers” also emerge in the Times’ coverage of the event.151 Unfortunately however, 
these new terms, which do little to break up the repetition of the use of “terrorists,” retain a 
similar dehumanizing effect and provide no further representation of the identities and 
motivations of the attackers.  
Overall, compared to the pre-9/11 coverage until the Dubrovka Crisis, the labeling of 
attackers by the New York Times underwent a major shift. With the label of “terrorists” no longer 
limited to the discourse of Russian officials, readers of the Times are presented with a much 
different representation of the conflict than before 9/11, one that stresses random and 
irreconcilable violence rather than an increasingly desperate and brutal war of independence. In 
both the Dubrovka Crisis and the attacks before September 11th, the attackers targeted and killed 
civilians (although on a greater scale beforehand) and yet in the latter case they were “rebels” 
and in the former “terrorists.”  
A second major shift in the coverage of the Dubrovka Theater Crisis is the increased 
amount of “personal depiction of victims,” including much more detail and background than in 
the previous events. As opposed to the relative lack of attention to the victims and their 
experience in the pre-9/11 coverage, “personal depiction of victims” is perhaps the most 
dominant frame of representation in the Times’ depiction of Dubrovka. Interviews and 
backstories on victims and their handling of the crisis appear repeatedly in the coverage, 
providing consumers with a method of relating, understanding, and empathizing with the 
victims’ experience of the attack.  
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Overall, the personalization and sympathy in the average Times article increased 
dramatically in the coverage of the Dubrovka Crisis. For example, many of the articles follow 
the narrative of specific victims and their experience in the theater. One such article begins with 
a quote from a hostage, “We were waiting to die.” The article goes on to provide details of the 
hostage’s dramatic time in the crisis and even closes with another powerful quote, “I am sure that 
we were saved from imminent death.”152 This style is very common in much of the Times 
reporting on Dubrovka. The emphasis on the victim’s experience and personal recollection helps 
to construct much of the narrative and in doing so gives readers a much more intimate 
perspective of their experience. Other articles use a similar format but focus instead on the 
victim’s families, drawing empathy for the fear and anxiety amidst the chaos.153 Additionally, 
Times articles include an increased focus on the graphic details of the setting, thus providing 
readers with a method of personal engagement with the story. For example, in one article, the 
Times highlights the experience of the victims by describing the “red upholstered theater seats” 
and the way that hostages formed a “long line… for a private corner of the orchestra pit” when 
allowed to go to the bathroom.154 Superfluous details like this do not offer any explanation of the 
cause of the event, but they do allow readers to better imagine the reality of the event from the 
victims’ perspective. The repetition of scenic details and graphic descriptions of the chaos allow 
the reader to relate to the victim’s experience, a form of empathy not granted to the opposition. 
In addition to the increased personalization of the Dubrovka Crisis reporting, a 
considerable portion of the Times’ coverage is devoted to covering only the victims’ experiences 
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rather than the event itself. For example, one of the Times’ articles tells the specific story of one 
college student on a date at the theater that night, while another focuses entirely on the director 
and actors in the play and how they coped with the attack.155 These articles and several others 
represent a type of personalization almost entirely absent in the pre-9/11 coverage. The value of 
displaying the humanity and personality of the victims supersedes the importance of providing 
insight into the causes of the attack; as a result readers are showered with stories and details that 
prompt deeper sympathy.  
Another example of the more personal nature of the New York Times’ Dubrovka coverage 
is visible in the ways that the paper presents a personal connection between the US and Russia. 
For example, in an article addressing the aftermath of the crisis, the Times describes how the 
“disaster… evoked the Sept. 11 tragedy in its randomness and unpredictability.”156 Not only does 
this draw a very direct connection between the US and Russian experiences of terror, it also 
blatantly buries the historical and political context behind the Dubrovka Crisis. Another article 
describes, “Like Americans after Sept. 11, Russians are trying to rebuild and resist fear and 
depression.”157 For readers, this type of presentation evokes a sense of empathy and 
identification with the US experience with September 11th, but it also serves to blind the reader 
to the root causes of the Russo-Chechen conflict in the first place. Another example of this can 
be seen in an article that addresses the type of knockout gas used by Russian forces when 
storming the building. Far from critical of the Russian tactics, the article describes 
sympathetically how the US has also looked into similar technologies for incapacitation since the 
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September 11th attacks and would benefit from such a discovery, glossing over the fact that the 
Russian gas had killed 117 hostages and the attackers only killed two.158 The understanding tone 
of the article stands in stark contrast to the pre-9/11 coverage and offers readers a view that is 
sympathetic to the Russian authorities as victims of the “terrorists’” harsh ultimatum, thus 
conveying the killing of over 100 civilians in a more relatable light. 
Although the vast majority of the personal and sympathetic perspectives provided by the 
Times relate to either the actual victims of the attack or the Russian authorities, a few articles do 
still personalize the Chechen experience as well. This sympathy stems primarily from two 
commentary pieces published on the event (a theme which is prevalent in much of the post-9/11 
coverage). In contrast to the rest of the articles, the commentaries provide a deep historical 
background of the conflict and specifically highlight the atrocities committed against Chechen 
civilians throughout the dispute.159 Additionally, the Times also published one article that relates 
the experience of Chechen citizens in Moscow after the event, highlighting a seemingly 
indiscriminate crackdown similar to the reaction after the September Apartment Bombings.160 
However, although these minority articles present a contrast to the dominant discourse defined 
by the Times, they fail to balance out the large amount of sympathy for the Russian victims. 
Overall, the increase in sympathetic and personal coverage of Dubrovka in comparison to 
the pre-9/11 events is startling. Although the extended nature of a hostage crisis may account for 
some of this increased detail and background, the dramatic scale of the shift indicates that there 
is a larger factor influencing the coverage. It is likely that the personal experience of the 
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September 11th attacks influenced the Times’ interpretation, and thus presentation, of the hostage 
crisis. Readers of the Times depiction of the Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis are presented with 
a human, positive, and relatable view of the Russian victims of the attack, and as a result are 
likely to sympathize and support the Russian perspective. 
Another noticeable shift in the Dubrovka Crisis coverage is the decline in the balance 
between the “Russian POV” and “Chechen POV” frames of representation. Due to the extended 
nature and personal coverage of the Dubrovka Hostage Crisis, it is unsurprising that the articles 
exhibit a sizeable increase in the presentation of the Russian point of view, but what is troubling 
is that this marked a decrease in the representation of Chechen perspectives, as if reporting was a 
zero-sum game. In theory, due to the overwhelmingly larger availability of Russian perspectives 
presented to readers, it would be prudent to also include an increased amount of Chechen 
perspectives in order to provide a more well-rounded and complete understanding of events. 
However, in the coverage of the post-9/11 events, the Chechen narrative within the conflict is all 
but silenced by the focus on terrorism, and its random and violent nature. 
Despite the rise of the “Russian POV” as the dominant perspective within the discourse 
of the New York Times’ Dubrovka Crisis coverage, a few articles still provide a Chechen 
perspective. For example, one article covering the aftermath of the attack addresses not only the 
Russian perspective of the terror, but also discusses reports that Russian officers had 
“systematically tortured criminal suspects nationwide, and had committed ‘serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian laws’ in Chechnya.”161 Although rare, excerpts like 
this provide the reader with a picture of a violent and complex conflict that is not purely one-
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sided. Another article acknowledges the destruction on both sides by describing how “citizens 
have been driven to the guerillas’ cause by the Russian Army’s brutal handling of civilians.”162 
This type of depiction does not impose the role of victim or villain on either party, but instead 
provides a more realistic perspective of the back-and-forth and escalating nature of the violence. 
Such rounded views of the conflict enable readers to better draw conclusions as to its causes and 
potential solutions. However, even when combined with the above noted, balanced commentary 
pieces and articles on Russian police profiling of Chechens, these articles still only account for a 
small minority of the coverage, thereby burying, for the most part, the Chechen perspective.  
The numerous interviews and perspectives from Russian victims and citizens greatly 
outweigh the press coverage given to the Chechen side of the conflict. As previously mentioned, 
a large portion of the narrative of the event is told primarily through the eyes of victims and their 
families. Although this method is understandable given the chaotic nature of the attack, it does 
not explain the diminished coverage of the Chechen point of view. Without a balance of 
perspectives within the coverage, the statements from the Russian perspective drown out any 
viewpoint that takes into account the atrocities committed by both sides. Although these witness 
statements are too many to recount in this article, one representative piece describing the 
destruction of livelihoods in the theater quotes a hostage stating, “It is the most horrible thing 
imaginable…I’ve seen so many nightmares.”163 Readers of this type of coverage are bombarded 
by the graphic and detailed accounts of the violence in the theater and in doing so given a one-
sided point of view of the conflict as a whole. 
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A final major shift between the pre- and post-9/11 coverage of the New York Times is the 
prominence of the “context of wave of terror” frame of representation. In its pre-9/11 coverage, 
the Times is careful to present a historical context for the attacks and to highlight the nationalist 
roots of the dispute. However, in the Dubrovka Crisis coverage, the historical context is partially 
replaced with one that places the attack within the setting of international terrorism. An example 
of this shift can be seen in one of the Times’ editorial pieces discussing the knockout gas used in 
the raid by Russian special forces. The article describes the importance of the development of 
such technologies “in an age of terrorism” in order to protect the country from attacks. This 
context of “an age of terrorism” carries special meaning, as it implies several things: the US 
experience with terror is linked and similar to the Russian experience; and terrorism is a new 
phenomenon, seemingly unexplainable but unlikely to go away. Both of these implications 
conceal any sort of political or historical source for the violence of Dubrovka, an ignorance that 
ensures a misunderstanding of the conflict as a whole. Another example of this type of 
contextualization can be seen in an article that describes how “Chechen militants fought 
alongside Taliban and Qaeda [sic.] members in Afghanistan, and experts say the separatist 
movement… has been financed by Middle Eastern and Asian groups tied to Al Qaeda and 
terror.”164 This acknowledgement represents a major shift in the Times’ coverage, a shift that 
reflects a more accepting view of Putin’s longstanding claims of international terrorism in 
Chechnya. The articles regarding the pre-9/11 events never recognized any assertions of “a 
foreign terrorist role” in the conflict.165 This shift stresses the context of international terror, 
which in turn detaches the attack from historical and political motives.  
                                                 




However, in some measure, the Times still balances this context with more information 
on the historical and nationalist nature of the conflict. Almost all of the commentary pieces 
published on the attacks go into great depths about the historical nature of the conflict, one of 
which is even entirely focused on why the Russo-Chechen conflict cannot be considered part of 
international terrorism. The article describes, “it was far from clear whether the Chechen 
hostage-takers were linked to Al Qaeda or any other foreign organization,” and goes on to 
describe the differences between the US and Russian experiences with terror. This background 
and criticism of the international terror angle provides an effective counter to the other contexts 
in the coverage. Overall, the reporting provided by the Times’ coverage of the Dubrovka Crisis 
provides a synthesis of frames of representation, mixing the “context of wave of terror” with the 
“context of historical conflict.” However, despite the lack of dominance from either frame, this 
mixture still represents a major shift from the historically focused context of the pre-9/11 events 
and as a result provides readers with a much different understanding of the conflict. 
The New York Times extensive coverage of the Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis 
illustrates a major change in thematic frames of representation provided by the publication. 
Despite the similarities between the attacks before and after 9/11, the attackers cease to be 
“rebels” and they are now “terrorists” and thus inherit the stigma that is associated with their new 
label. Additionally, the personal and detailed depiction of the event provides a much more 
sympathetic and relatable representation for readers. The pre-9/11 balance of points of view is 
also lost in the Dubrovka coverage, as the Chechen voice is marginalized from the dominant 
discourse. Finally, the context of the conflict also exhibits a shift, as the rising threat of 
international terrorism partially displaces the political history behind the dispute. These changes 
provide a very different portrayal of the Russo-Chechen conflict for readers, a portrayal that is 
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dominated by unexplainable and random violence and a more subjective presentation of victim 
and villain.  
3.1.2 THE WASHINGTON POST 
Much like the New York Times, the Washington Post’s coverage underwent a thematic shift 
between its reporting of the pre-9/11 events and that of the Dubrovka Crisis, albeit a much less 
drastic one. Nonetheless, this change in the pattern of frames of representation within the 
coverage still projects a much different image of the conflict to the Post’s readers. Consequently, 
readers of the post-9/11 reporting understand the conflict in a much different manner than 
previously.  
Although the label of “terrorist” rose to prominence in US political discourse after the 
attacks on September 11th, the Washington Post, for the most part, continues to use the term 
carefully in its post-9/11 coverage of the Russo-Chechen conflict. As opposed to the New York 
Times, which embraced the label as its new dominant frame of representation, the dominant 
frame for the Washington Post’s coverage remains “Chechen attackers as separatists.” However, 
despite this continued preeminence, the “terrorist” label appears increasingly in the Post’s 
Dubrovka Crisis reporting. For example, in a few of the Post’s articles covering the attack, the 
label appears alongside less charged terms like “rebel” and “guerilla.” In one article, the Post 
describes the commander of the attack, “the young Chechen rebel whose terrorists… had seized 
the hostages.”166 Although this usage creates a more ambiguous picture of the militants, the Post 
counters this by utilizing other labels such as “Chechen rebels” and “guerillas” in a more 
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frequently than does the Times.167 In fact, in the articles where “terrorist” is used most freely, the 
Post ensures the protection of the political nature of the conflict by drawing important 
distinctions between the “terrorists” who attacked the theater and the “legitimate political 
movement” seeking independence and peace.168 By making this distinction, the Post is able to 
condemn the terrorists while continuing to convey the political and historical nature of the 
conflict as a whole, thus presenting readers with a more rounded understanding of the attacks.  
Additionally, the majority of the Post’s coverage preserves the pre-9/11 reporting policy 
of relegating the label of “terrorist” to quotes by officials and civilians. For example, it reports 
that “Putin said he would ‘never make any deal with terrorists,’” thus presenting the official 
Russian policy on the conflict without adopting its rhetoric.169 The main terms used by the Post 
in identifying the attackers in the Dubrovka Crisis coverage remain “Chechen rebels” and 
“guerillas”, much like the in the pre-9/11 events.170 Hence, readers of the Post’s coverage are 
offered a presentation of the Chechen attackers that, while condemning their actions, retains the 
historical and political disputes that remain at the root of the conflict. However, despite the 
continued dominance of the “Chechen attackers as separatists” frame, the rise of the use of 
“terrorists” as a label still represents a notable shift in coverage.  
A much more drastic shift in the Washington Post’s coverage of the Dubrovka Theater 
Hostage Crisis is the ample increase in the “personal depiction of victims” within the articles. 
The detail and background applied to the victims in the Post’s coverage greatly outdistances that 
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of the Times. For example, in one article, the Post describes the particular experience of one 
couple split up by the crisis relating personal text messages, describing the chaotic emotions in 
detail, and even providing the back story of how the lovers met stating, “The two met in a 
Moscow nightclub four years ago. He was a tall, thin 34-year-old with a wicked sense of humor 
and a devotion to the piano and guitar.”171 Details like these make the stories very personal for 
the reader, allowing them to relate personally to the experiences of people whose lives were 
deeply affected by the attack. Another article highlights two of the child actors who were killed 
in the attack, describing their close friendship, and even speculating about a hypothetical 
romance between the 13 and 14 year-old children. The details attributed to their story are 
exceedingly vivid, “His is such a boyish smile, hers are such wide haunting eyes”172 This 
reporting reads more like a novel than a news report and not only induces empathy from the 
reader, but also is commonplace throughout the Washington Post’s Dubrovka reporting. Much 
like with the Times’ coverage, other articles use the perspective of victims and families in order 
to relate the narrative of the attack to readers, including one story that spans two separate 
articles.173 Perhaps the most startling aspect of this shift is the intense graphic imagery utilized 
by the publication. Several articles describe, “the decrepit basketball court of a shabby vocational 
school” where “tear-stained moms and somber dads” waited for news about their loved ones, the 
“agonizing vigil” of by a husband waiting for news about his wife, and the “frilly white dress 
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that looked like a wedding gown” worn by one of the child victims.174 The vivid and meticulous 
nature of these descriptions allows readers to form a clear image of the victims in their head and 
thus relate and empathize with the horror of their experience. As a result, the readers of the 
Post’s Dubrovka Crisis articles are encouraged to identify with and support the victims of the 
attack, even if that means burying the larger issues within the conflict that have escalated the 
dispute to this level of violence.  
In only one case does the Dubrovka Crisis coverage focus directly on the personal 
experience of Chechens. The article covers the experience of several Chechens living in Moscow 
and dealing with the brutality of the indiscriminate crackdown that followed Dubrovka.175 
However, the vast majority of articles that personalize the Russian victims’ experience of the 
Dubrovka Crisis overshadow this piece. With the dominance of the “personal depiction of 
victims” frame of representation, the Washington Post’s Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis 
reporting offers a much different perspective on the victims of the attack than was provided by 
the objective and detached reporting of the pre-9/11 attacks. Instead, readers are showered with 
graphic descriptions, long backstories, and many personal details allowing them to relate on a 
human level with the victims and their experiences during the attack. As a result, these readers 
may feel much more compelled to support the victims and than to develop a complete narrative 
of the overall conflict. 
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Although the Post provides a much more personal narrative of the Russian victims of the 
attack, it still retains a sizable representation of the “Chechen POV” frame of representation. 
This presentation of both points of view creates a sense of dialogue and clash between the two 
that allows the reader to gain a more complete understanding of the conflict and its nature. For 
example, in order to counter the attention attributed to the Russian victim and official narratives 
within the conflict, the Post also includes an article describing the background of the Chechen 
leader in the attack.176 The article describes the man’s adoption of violence and shares a 
perspective of the attackers that is lacking in the New York Times’ coverage. Another example of 
the recognition given to the “Chechen POV” can be found in a commentary piece published by 
the Post written by the famous Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya. The piece narrates 
Politkovskaya’s experience negotiating with the captors and discusses the oppressive context that 
has pushed the Russo-Chechen conflict into the current level of violence and extremism.177 
Although this type of background is most profoundly present in commentary and editorial pieces, 
the Chechen viewpoint of the backlash from the conflict is additionally available in a regular 
article as well.178 These examples clearly exemplify an effort by the Post to maintain a more 
balanced presentation of the conflict for their readers; however, the most apparent examples of 
this commitment are visible in the dialogue fostered by several of the publication’s articles. 
In an editorial published during the tense moments of the Hostage Crisis, the Post 
criticizes the Russian government’s handling of the Russo-Chechen conflict as a whole, 
highlighting the Chechen viewpoint on self-determination and the failure of the Russian military 
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to distinguish between moderate and extreme factions within Chechnya.179 This editorial is an 
example of the preservation of the Chechen point of view, but what is more striking is that the 
Post additionally published a response to the editorial from the Russian Ambassador Yuri 
Ushakov. In an example of journalistic integrity, the Post printed the Ambassador’s harsh 
criticism of the Post’s writing, which presented the Russian point of view in the conflict and 
heavily chastised the editorial staff of the publication.180 This is not the only example of this 
juxtaposition of presentations; for example, the Post also published a letter responding to another 
article that was very critical of the Russian handling of the crisis and conflict.181 These instances 
of dialogue between perspectives represent the attempt by the publication to maintain an equal 
balance of the “Chechen POV” and “Russian POV” in its coverage, thus providing readers with a 
more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the conflict. 
Another shift in the Washington Post’s Dubrovka Crisis coverage is the appearance of the 
“context of wave of terror” frame of representation. However, the presence of this frame is 
typically limited, and the “context of historical conflict” frame remains the dominant context 
within the Post’s discourse. The most profound instances of the wave of terror context are 
exhibited in the commentary pieces featured in the Post rather than the regular reporting. For 
example, in one such piece, connections are drawn between the US War on Terror and Russia’s 
struggles with Chechnya, citing a Chechen “alliance with Taliban” and “hospitality to al Qaeda 
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representatives.”182 Although this creates a perception of the conflict that is entirely devoid of 
political or historical context, several articles and editorials within the Post’s coverage counter 
this viewpoint. One such editorial criticizes Putin’s claims of international terror connections, 
citing that “Mr. Maskhadov… fairly represents the aspirations of a nation that has been brutally 
subjugated by Russia.”183 This type of narrative counteracts the opposing claims of international 
terror, and seeks to provide the reader with a view of Chechens that distinguishes between 
moderate and extreme. Overall, these claims of the conflict resulting from the plague of “global 
Islamic terrorism” are overshadowed by the majority of the Post’s coverage, which remains 
skeptical of Putin’s claims of the former.184  
One example of this is clear in an article covering the aftermath of the rescue attempt. 
The article cites how Putin “linked the incident to the global war on terrorism,” but quickly 
countered this perspective with an acknowledgement that the separatists “say they are fighting 
for self-determination in Chechnya and reject the terrorist label.”185 In this way, the Post offers a 
balance of contexts, allowing the reader to better understand the perspectives and motivations 
held on both sides of the conflict. Several other articles also only use Putin’s claims of 
“international terrorism” within quotations, and provide a counterpoint to this perspective with 
the history of Russia’s “brutal battle in Chechnya, where Russian troops have waged two wars… 
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in an unsuccessful campaign to smother separatist ambitions.”186 This type of coverage provides 
readers with a sense of a conflict characterized by a long-standing and complex conflict based 
around nationalism, rather than one sparked by the sudden onset of random terrorism. The 
retained dominance of the “context of historical conflict” frame thus continues to create a more 
well-rounded understanding of the conflict for readers of the Post’s Dubrovka coverage. 
Overall, the shifts in the Washington Post’s Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis coverage 
are much less drastic than that of the New York Times. However, the change that occurs still 
reflects a different attitude within the publication toward the Russo-Chechen conflict in the post-
9/11 era. Further, the drastically increased personalization of the coverage not only serves to 
increase the empathy of readers, but also reflects an increased empathy from the publication 
itself. Despite this, the Washington Post still presents a much more impartial interpretation of the 
conflict surrounding the Dubrovka Crisis than the Times by effectively managing its labeling of 
the Chechens, the presentation of points of view, and the contextualization of the attacks. 
3.1.3 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
The Wall Street Journal provides perhaps the most balanced and consistent presentation of the 
Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis, especially when examined in comparison to its pre-9/11 
coverage. However, the Journal’s coverage is also much smaller and more detached than its 
contemporaries. Despite this, the Journal formulates a specific reality of the Russo-Chechen 
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conflict through a repetition of particular frames of representation. Readers of the Journal are 
thus presented with a picture of the event that is comparable to that of the pre-9/11 events. 
The first notable comparison between the Wall Street Journal’s pre-9/11 and Dubrovka 
Crisis coverage is the continued dominance of the “Chechen attackers as separatists” frame of 
representation. In fact, the label of “terrorist” is used by the publication in only one article on the 
Crisis, while any other references to the term are limited to quotations, descriptions of tactics, or 
heavily buffered by distinctions from the separatist movement. Even within the article in which 
the label is applied more loosely, the Journal still provides a countering perspective on this 
usage, acknowledging that the label “terrorist” may be a tactic by Russian officials to garner 
Western support and understanding.187 Additionally, the majority of articles that use the label 
(which remains a minority within the total coverage) favor its usage as a description of tactics 
used by a party at war. For example, several articles refer to the Hostage Crisis as a “terrorist 
attack” or “act of terror,” while the attackers themselves continue to retain the titles of 
“separatist” and “rebel.”188 Further, other articles preserve the pre-9/11 policy of only using the 
term in reference to quotes by Russian officials or victims. While an article may quote the 
Russian President or a victim as calling the Chechens “terrorists”, the publication itself prefers 
terms like “guerilla,” “militant,” and “rebel.”189 A final method for curbing the influence of 
“terrorist” as a label, appears in an editorial on the attack in which the Journal makes a clear 
distinction between the “terrorists” (the attackers in the theater) and the greater legitimate 
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separatist movement.190 Overall, these measures ensure that the “terrorist” label does not 
overpower the historical context of the Russo-Chechen conflict. 
Moreover, the vast majority of the Journal’s coverage refrains from the usage of the term 
altogether. These articles tell the story of  “a Moscow theater held by Chechen militants” and 
how “40 Chechen rebels seized as many as 700 people.”191 In this way, the majority of the 
Journal’s coverage creates a depiction of the attackers not only as legitimate warring parties, but 
one that is also often attributed a specific national identity. Thus the readers are provided with an 
interpretation of the conflict that is characterized by separatist rebellion rather than one that is 
stripped of any political agenda.  
Another notable frame of representation that remains dominant in the Journal’s cover of 
the Dubrovka Crisis is the “impersonal depiction of victims.” In this aspect, the Journal differs 
greatly from the other two publications. There are no articles based entirely on the victims or on 
any specific person’s narrative, and no descriptions match the background and scene setting 
provided by the other papers. Additionally, no mention is made of the experience of the victims’ 
families or the experience within the theater, topics that received close attention in the Times and 
Post. Instead, the only examples of the victim’s voice or perspective within the Journal’s 
coverage are limited to very rare short quotes from victims, providing minimal background. In 
one such example the Journal quotes “Veronika Panova, a 27-year-old engineer,” briefly 
describing her time in the hospital but providing no background or further experience than 
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that.192 One of the few other examples is a quote from “Georgy Vasiliev” about the musical, 
providing no further background than his job and status as a hostage.193 In this way, the Journal 
maintains a very detached stance within its Dubrovka Hostage Crisis coverage, which provides 
readers with a much less sympathetic, human, and personal understanding of the victims. 
In fact the vast majority of the Journal’s coverage ignores the victims’ perspective 
altogether. These articles instead provide a narrative through the raw facts of the event and 
testimony by experts and officials. The only mention of the victims in these articles is the 
number of dead, if they are even mentioned at all.194 The Journal focuses more on the political 
implications of the event rather than on humanizing and understanding the victims. Thus, readers 
of the Journal are much less likely than their counterparts of the Times and Post to feel 
compelled to support or sympathize with the victims of the Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis. 
Another feature of the Wall Street Journal’s Dubrovka Crisis coverage is its preservation 
of a relative balance between the “Russian POV” and “Chechen POV”. Although several articles 
acknowledge only the Russian perspective of the conflict, the rest of the coverage does a 
respectable job of presenting a more holistic reality of the dispute. An example of the purely 
“Russian POV” can be seen in one Journal article discussing the aftermath of the attack. 
Although a Russian victim and several Russian experts and officials are quoted, the Chechen 
narrative is withheld from the article.195 The danger of such reporting is that, much like with the 
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label of “terrorist,” it strips the attackers of any human qualities or motivations. Rather than 
being a result of years of brutal separatist war and historical conflict, the Chechens become static 
villains, natural bad guys attacking civilians for seemingly no cause other than their inherent evil 
nature. But for the most part, the Journal protects against this effect by providing more open 
access to the Chechen perspective of the conflict, even more so than the Washington Post and 
New York Times.  
The majority of the Journal’s “Chechen POV” frame of representation appears in the 
editorial and commentary pieces covering the Dubrovka Crisis. For example, one editorial 
counters the brutality of the Hostage Crisis with the admission that “Russia’s military has 
ravaged Chechnya and radicalized some of its population,” thereby contributing to the increasing 
civilian violence.196 Additionally, two other commentary pieces focus on the Chechen 
perspective of the greater conflict and how the experience of the Chechen people could lead to 
violent attacks like Dubrovka.197 Several of the news articles published by the Journal also 
convey the “Chechen POV” frame. For example, one article quotes a Russian anti-war protester 
describing, “When an entire nation is marginalized, you can expect anything.” The article goes 
on to quote a Chechen journalist’s take on the attack and provide details of the Chechen 
experience of the war.198 Another example of the balance of POVs appears in an article 
describing who was responsible for the Dubrovka Crisis. While the article explains that Russian 
officials blame Aslan Maskhadov for the attack, it also counters this with Chechen claims that 
                                                 
196 "Putin's 9/11." Wall Street Journal, Oct 28, 2002, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/398865848?accountid=14709. 
197 Thomas de Waal, "The Chechen War." Wall Street Journal, Oct 28, 2002, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/398815450?accountid=14709; Ivan Rybkin, "Chechen Roulette." Wall Street 
Journal, Oct 29, 2002, http://search.proquest.com/docview/398809207?accountid=14709. 
198 Higgins and Whalen. "For Putin, Mixed Victory Over Chechen Terrorists --- Theater Triumph may Help 
Discredit Islamist Forces Behind Chechnya Rebellion." 
 72 
militant leader Shamil Basayev alone ordered the hostage-taking.199 Thus, the Journal retains a 
measured balance between Chechen and Russian perspectives within its coverage, thus providing 
readers with a deeper and more complex understanding of the Dubrovka Crisis and its roots. 
A final characteristic of the Wall Street Journal’s Dubrovka Theater Hostage Crisis 
coverage is the continued dominance of the “context of historical conflict” over the “context of 
wave of terror.” Although connections to international terrorism are much more common within 
the post-9/11 reporting, the Journal often only presents these claims in reference to claims by 
Russian officials, thereby distancing the publication from them and withholding validation of the 
claims. For example, one article describes how “Mr. Putin’s claims… that Russia’s enemies in 
Chechnya are terrorists, not freedom fighters,” received more support by Western governments 
in the aftermath of Dubrovka.200 Similarly, another article notes that, “Putin portrayed the 
seizure… as the latest act of terrorism by Islamic militants.”201 By attributing these claims to 
President Putin and refusing to confirm their validity, the Journal manages to present readers 
with the perspective of the Russian government while maintaining its distance from Russian 
policy. Other articles present the “context of wave of terror,” but alongside one finds the 
opposing “context of historical conflict.” In these cases, claims of “extensive links between 
Chechen terrorism and al Qaeda” are presented along with claims that Russia has brought the 
violence on itself through “the brutality of its military and a blanket rejection of all negotiation 
with the rebels.”202 Rather than favoring one of the frames, the articles present the two different 
contexts as part of an ongoing debate in the international community over the nature of the 
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conflict. In fact, the strongest support of the “context of wave of terror” frame of representation 
comes from one of the Journal’s own editorials, which chastises Putin for his criticism of the US 
calls for war against Saddam Hussein. The article goes on to speculate that perhaps Putin will be 
more supportive now that “Islamic terrorists have struck in the heart of Moscow.”203 However, 
despite this affirmation of connections to international terrorism, the Journal’s coverage still 
maintains strong representation of the historical nature of the conflict. 
Several of the commentary pieces published in the Journal provide an extensive look at 
the history of the Russo-Chechen conflict. These articles describe the Russo-Chechen Wars of 
the 1990s, and one even describes the conflicts roots “in the history of the Russian Empire and 
the memories of deportation by Stalin.”204 These descriptions provide readers with a greater 
historical knowledge of the region and conflict, as well as an affirmation that the roots of the 
current violence are historical rather than based on new international terror. In addition to these 
descriptions, other articles addressing the context also affirm this perspective. One such article 
contextualizes the conflict in Chechnya by describing the fighting of “two inconclusive wars in 
the past decade.” Overall, these descriptions prevent readers of the Journal from the burying of 
the historical and separatist roots of the violence, thereby preserving a more accurate depiction of 
the conflict as a whole. 
Overall, the coverage provided by the Wall Street Journal of the Dubrovka Theater 
Hostage Crisis remains consistent with the publication’s pre-9/11 reporting. The distant and 
detached coverage by the Journal combined with the presentation of both Chechen and Russian 
perspectives ensures that readers receive a more balanced picture of the conflict. Additionally, 
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the avoidance of the label of “terrorist” for the attackers along with the preservation of the 
historical roots to the conflict prevent the dehumanization of the Chechen people. However, the 
emergence of connections to an international terrorist phenomenon in the coverage, even when 
overwhelmed by another contextualization, speaks to a changing trend in the publication’s 
perspective. 
3.2 MOSCOW METRO BOMBING 
On February 6, 2004, a bomb exploded on a Moscow metro train traveling between stations. 
Russian officials quickly placed the blame for the explosion, which killed 41 and injured 120, on 
Chechen rebels, while leaders of the separatist movement denied such claims.205 The explosion 
was the final in a series of attacks on Russian soil, and once again brought the Chechen conflict 
to the forefront of Russian conversations and anxieties, and further undermined the Russian 
people’s confidence in the government and police to keep them safe. 
The coverage devoted to the Moscow Metro Bombing in March 2003 is by far the 
smallest of the post-9/11 events. However, although this means that the frames presented in the 
event are less representative of the post-9/11 coverage as a whole, the bombing remains an 
important and significant comparison to the pre-9/11 events for several reasons. First of all, the 
location and nature of the attack as a seemingly random bombing of a public area in Moscow 
makes the event an appropriate counterpoint to both the September Apartment Bombings and the 
Moscow Underpass Bombing. Additionally, as opposed to the other two post-9/11 attacks, the 
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Metro Bombing resulted in international attention comparable to that of the Underpass Bombing 
and the Southern Russia Car Bombs. Thus, despite its much smaller coverage, the attack is 
essential for providing more well-rounded and accurate conclusions on the nature of the change 
in coverage by the three publications. 
3.2.1 THE NEW YORK TIMES 
The New York Times’ coverage of the Moscow Metro Bombing in February 2004 bears much 
more similarity to the paper’s coverage of the Dubrovka Crisis than to its pre-9/11 reporting. The 
repetitive yet distinct patter of frames of representation utilized in the Times’ coverage provides 
readers with a similar presentation of the Russo-Chechen conflict as a whole, especially when 
compared to the pre-9/11 coverage. In order to effectively illustrate this representation of the 
conflict, this author has identified specific examples that are demonstrative of the coverage as a 
whole. 
A first interesting shift in the Time’s coverage of the Metro Bombing that departs both 
from the pre-9/11 and Dubrovka examples is the mix of “Chechen attackers as separatists” and 
“Chechen attackers as terrorists” frames of representation, though this may be a result of the 
nature of the attack. Although the phrase “terrorist” along with terror and terrorism appear very 
frequently in the coverage, they are almost never used to label the attackers. For example, in 
several articles, the Times refers to “a wave of terrorist bombings,” “terrorism’s grim results,” 
and a “long string of terrorist attacks around the country.”206 In this case, the use of terror in 
                                                 
206 Erin E. Arvedlund, "Ride during Moscow Rush Ends Under Pile of Bodies." New York Times (1923-Current 
File), Feb 08, 2004, http://search.proquest.com/docview/92782486?accountid=14709; Steven Lee Myers, "19 Die in 
Moscow S Bomb Goes Off --On Subway Train." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 07, 2004, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/92844470?accountid=14709; Seth Mydans, "Air of Anxiety in Moscow After 
 76 
describing the attacks is much higher than in any previous coverage, but the Times withholds the 
human labeling of Chechens as terrorists. As such, this is a different usage of the term than 
identified in either the pre-9/11 or Dubrovka coverage. However, rather than reflecting a change 
in policy of the Times, this may reflect the nature of the bombing as an unclaimed attack without 
a clear perpetrator. Although Russian officials immediately attributed the bombing to Chechen 
terrorism (as in previous events), in the initial aftermath, the perpetrator of the explosion was 
unclear. As a result, the labeling of a specific attacker was not possible. If Russian officials had 
uncovered concrete evidence illustrating a Chechen bombing before the Times coverage had 
moved on from the event, it is unclear what labeling the Times might have been used.  
On the other hand, the publication consistently depicts the Chechens fighting within 
Chechnya as separatists. In several articles referring to the movement within Chechnya, the 
Times’ coverage uses phrases such as, “Putin ruled out any talks with Chechen separatists” and 
“Russia’s latest war to quell separatists”.207 While this serves to ground the readers’ perceptions 
of the Chechens in the reality of a nationalist struggle for independence, it may also be a 
reflection of a lack of connection between that struggle and the bombing at the time in which the 
reporting was done. These descriptions, combined with a more widespread use of “terrorist” as a 
description of attacks on Russian soil, make it difficult to discern the impact of labeling within 
the coverage of the Metro Bombing on the Times’ readers’ understanding of the Russo-Chechen 
conflict. As a result, the other frames of representation present within the coverage obtain an 
enhanced role in constructing the reality of the conflict for readers.  
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One of the dominant frames of representation present in both the Dubrovka and Moscow 
Metro Bombing coverage is the “personal depiction of victims.” The majority of the Metro 
Bombing coverage consists of victims’ personal narratives and graphic descriptions of the attack, 
much like the reporting of the Hostage Crisis. In one such article, the Times graphically describes 
how the explosion “shredded bodies, complicating the grim task of counting the dead, let alone 
identifying them.” This imagery is combined with a victim’s description of survivors “trudging 
out in darkness with their clothes and hair scorched.”208 Such a presentation allows readers to 
better imagine the victims’ experience and picture their plight, thus promoting greater sympathy.  
Another article traces the narrative of Anna A. Lvova, a victim who survived “because 
she was buried under the dead.”209 The article then discusses the effect of the terror attacks on 
Moscow’s hospitals including an interview with a doctor who treated victims of several of the 
attacks. The piece closes with a quote from the doctor regarding future attacks stating, “‘We are 
ready,’ he said, smoking a cigarette in his office.”210 Powerful images like this further cement an 
understandable and humanist depiction of the Russian victims. Additionally, the Times’ devotes 
an entire article to the heart-wrenching experience of victim’s families. The piece describes the 
desperate attempts by families and parents to find information on their loved ones in the 
aftermath of the attack.211 Overall, the combination of frequent and personal descriptions of 
victims combined with graphic depictions of the explosion forces readers to experience the 
attack alongside the victims and thus sympathize with the pain of the victims.  
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Another similarity with the framing of the Dubrovka Crisis and the Metro Bombing 
coverage is the decrease in the “Chechen POV” in relation to the “Russian POV”. In contrast to 
the pre-9/11 coverage, the Chechen perspective is all but absent from the Times’ coverage of the 
Metro Bombing. One of the only examples of this presentation is in one article that attributes one 
sentence to Chechen complaints of police detention “based on little more than their ethnicity,” a 
subject that received its own articles in previous coverage.212 Additionally, other articles 
recognize Maskhadov’s response to the attack and acknowledge the racist claims made by 
nationalist politicians, but these small examples do little to present the Chechen perspective on 
the violence.213 
On the contrary, the dominant perspective provided within the Metro Bombing coverage 
is the “Russian POV” of the conflict. For example, an article discusses the toll that the attacks 
have taken on the civil society in Moscow, describing “waves of grief, fear, and suspicion” in 
response to the attack as well as the ever-heightened state of paranoia and preparation for further 
violence within the city.214 A comparable article notes that the attack “has brought a heightened 
sense of insecurity to Moscow.”215 Such presentations of fear and suffering among Russians are 
lacking in regards to the Chechen experience of the ongoing conflict, an experience characterized 
by violence on an even larger scale. Another article describes how the attacks have pushed one 
Moscow woman to the point of emigration because, as she described, “Russia had become a 
country where normal, peaceful life was out of reach.”216 This presentation effectively presents 
the response to the violence of the Russian people, while the suffering of the Chechen people 
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within the conflict is entirely ignored. As a result, readers are well informed about the anxiety of 
those living in Moscow, but are not told of the extensive destruction of life in Grozny.  
One of the most striking shifts in the New York Times’ Moscow Metro Bombing 
reporting is the increased influence of the “context of wave of terror” frame of representation. 
Although the “context of historical conflict” is continually acknowledged, often in tandem with 
the “wave of terror,” any elaboration on the historical nature of the conflict earlier than the mid-
1990s is completely absent. For example, one article states, “During the five years of Russia’s 
latest war to quell separatists… Moscow and other cities have borne the brunt of terrorist 
attacks.”217 Although this may seem like an effective acknowledgement of the historical context, 
this is the only mention of the wars in Chechnya in the article, which instead provides a narrative 
of other terrorist attacks, which “have often come in pairs.”218 Although the acknowledgement of 
other attacks is completely legitimate in providing a background for the explosion, when this is 
combined with the ignoring of the historical roots of the violence, it presents readers with a 
perspective that effectively denies much of the conflict. A similar article contextualizes the 
explosion by stating, “a long string of terrorist attacks around the country… have been linked to 
Chechen rebels.”219  
Despite this increased presentation of the conflict as a terror campaign, some of the 
Times’ reporting still retains the historical and national roots of the violence. One such article 
buffers the description of a “wave of terrorist bombings” with the background of “a long, 
devastating war in Chechnya” and a description of the independence movement under 
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Maskhadov.220 In spite of this, the rising prevalence of the “context of wave of terror” results in 
too little coverage of the true nature of the conflict. Readers of the Times’ coverage of the Metro 
Bombing are provided with much less historical background than in previous coverage and thus 
have a less complete understanding of the violence. 
Overall, the New York Times’ coverage of the Moscow Metro Bombing contains a 
thematic use of frames of representation that is much more comparable to the Dubrovka Crisis 
reporting than to its pre-9/11 coverage. The Times’ delivers to its readers a perspective of the 
conflict that is much less historically grounded than in the past. Additionally the increasing 
pervasiveness of the more open use of “terrorist”, along with the “context of wave of terror” 
frame represents a disconcerting trend in the Times’ post-9/11 coverage. 
3.2.2 THE WASHINGTON POST 
The Washington Post’s Moscow Metro Bombing utilizes a pattern of dominant frames of 
representation that is very consistent with those presented in its Dubrovka Crisis coverage. In 
this way, readers of the Post’s post-9/11 coverage receive a constant depiction of the Russo-
Chechen conflict that represents a slightly shifted perspective from the representation formed in 
the pre-9/11 coverage.  
The first dominant frame that remains consistent through the Post’s coverage is the 
“Chechen attackers as separatists” frame. Throughout the Metro Bombing coverage, as before, 
the Post commonly utilizes the labels “Chechen separatists” and “Chechen rebels” in presenting 
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the Chechens as potential suspects for the bombing.221 In this way, it is not only clear that the 
Chechens are actors representing a political cause, but also that their particular cause is one of 
nationalist separatism. The Post additionally distances itself from the accusations against the 
Chechen separatists by utilizing phrases such as, “Putin blamed the attack on secessionist rebels 
from Chechnya.”222 The Post thereby further distances itself from the claims, making it clear to 
readers that the identity and motivation of the bomber remain unclear. In fact, the infrequent uses 
of “terrorist” in the Metro Bombing coverage are in phrases such as “terror attacks” and 
“terrorist attacks,” both in reference to a recent string of bombings throughout Russia. However, 
despite this usage, the term remains rare in the Post’s coverage, and the publication does an 
effective job of presenting readers with an understanding of Chechen rebels that highlights the 
nationalist roots of their movement. 
Another consistency with the Dubrovka Crisis coverage present in the Post’s Metro 
Bombing reporting is the “personal depiction of victims” frame. Despite the drastically smaller 
coverage of the Metro Bombing, the Post continues to offer detailed background information and 
narratives provided by victims and witnesses. For example, in one article, the Post provides a 
graphic description of the metro train stating, “Many of the dead were still in their seats, and 
pieces of flesh littered the car.”223 In another article, the main narrative of the piece centers on 
the experience of one survivor. The emotional story of Marina Sedova is told in great detail, 
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from the explosion and evacuation when she was injured and began “weeping hysterically,” to 
her rescue by a kind stranger who quickly disappeared after.224 The article includes several other 
detailed witness testimonies as well, but none are as in depth as the story of Marina and her 
savior. Told entirely through Marina’s personal point of view, the narrative takes the reader from 
the darkness of the metro tunnel when “blood spilled down her face” to the hospital where 
Marina’s helper “waited patiently while the doctors treated her injuries.”225 The rich detail, 
graphic descriptions, and personal narrative allow readers to experience the attack through 
Marina’s eyes and thus relate to the victims in a way unoffered in the pre-9/11 coverage. In fact, 
the only article lacking a personal testimony from a victim is the first article covering the attack, 
which was published the day of the explosion and thus contains only minor preliminary 
details.226 Overall, the Post’s Metro Bombing coverage continues to use the personal 
humanization of the Russian victims that was present in the reporting on the Dubrovka Crisis. 
While the Washington Post continues to strongly present the “Russian POV” in its Metro 
Bombing coverage, the prevalence of the “Chechen POV” within the reporting decreases 
significantly. The Russian perspective on the attack is presented through a combination of 
reactions from politicians, officials, and regular Russian citizens. One article describes the large 
reaction of compassion from the Russian people to the attack as “large numbers… reported to 
blood banks to donate,” while also describing the reactions of survivors, who were “trying to 
recover and return to their lives.”227 Another article highlights the Russian political response to 
the bombing while also acknowledging the state of expectancy within Russia toward “periodic 
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terrorist attacks.”228 In these ways, the reader is able to appreciate the ways in which the attack 
and conflict as a whole have affected the Russian people and the ways in which they have 
reacted as a result.  
On the other hand, the Chechen perspective of the attack and conflict is minimized in the 
Washington Post’s coverage. The only reference to the Chechen experience of the conflict is a 
statement from Maskhadov’s spokesman consisting of a fervent denial of responsibility for the 
attacks and condemnations of terrorism as a tactic. The Post also presents Maskhadov’s claim 
that “Russian government policies toward Chechnya created the conditions to prompt such acts,” 
providing the most concrete example of a Chechen perspective of the attack in the Metro 
Bombing coverage.229 However, this single reference does little to counter the dominant frame of 
representation provided within the coverage of the “Russian POV”. Although it is unsurprising 
due to the nature and location of the attack that the Russian perspective receives the lion’s share 
of coverage, it still represents a shift in coverage from the pre-9/11 reporting. Further, this shift 
presents readers with an understanding of the conflict that is seen through the eyes of the Russian 
people, while depicting the Chechens only as attackers. 
Much like its Dubrovka Crisis, the Post’s coverage of the Metro Bombing favors a 
“context of historical conflict,” although the presence of the “context of wave of terror” is 
additionally present within the reporting. However, due to the modest amount of coverage and 
thus limited context provided, it is admittedly difficult to draw conclusions from this 
presentation. The majority of the context provided in the Post’s coverage refers to the Russo-
Chechen Wars of the 1990s. These presentations frame the current conflict as part of an ongoing 
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dispute with separatists, “who have been battling Russian forces for much of the past decade.”230 
Rather than bury the political roots to the violence, these articles embrace the historical context 
(albeit the recent history) and provide an understanding of the conflict as one that has grown out 
of national separatist ambitions. Additionally, although one article does describe examples of 
“periodic terror attacks” within Russia, this potentially misunderstood representation is only 
presented within the context of the ongoing war within Chechnya.231 Overall, the context 
provided by the Washington Post, however limited, presents a historical narrative to the Russo-
Chechen conflict that retains the political roots of the dispute. 
The Moscow Metro Bombing coverage of the Post presents a similar depiction of the 
Russo-Chechen conflict as is present in the Dubrovka Crisis coverage. The careful labeling of 
the Chechens and historical context attributed to the dispute provide readers with a more open 
and well-rounded perspective of the conflict. However, the heavy personalization of the Russian 
victims, as well as the rising dominance of the Russian point of view as opposed to the Chechen 
perspective convey an incomplete context for readers. 
3.2.3 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
The Wall Street Journal’s coverage of the Moscow Metro Bombing is by far the thinnest of the 
select sampling and therefore drawing solid conclusions from the small amount of articles is 
difficult. However, several trends are still visible within the coverage that are useful in 
understanding the shifting perspective of the Journal in the post-9/11 era. As such, this author 
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will use specific instances from the text to highlight these examples, while also admitting that the 
coverage of the event itself can not stand alone in drawing indisputable conclusions about the 
Journal’s post-9/11 perspective. 
The first frame of representation that is present within the Wall Street Journal’s Metro 
Bombing coverage is “Chechen attackers as terrorists.” Interestingly enough, there is actually no 
reference in the Journal’s coverage to the potential perpetrator(s) of the Metro Bombing, and 
very few instances in which the Chechens are mentioned at all. One example describes the 
vulnerability felt after the attack as comparable to that “last felt when terrorists from the Chechen 
republic seized a Moscow theater during the autumn of 2002.”232 Additionally, the use of 
terrorism as a descriptor of the Russian experience of the conflict is prevalent in the decreased 
coverage.233 The validation of these labels by the Journal, rather than in quotations from Russian 
officials, illustrates a shift from the pre-9/11 coverage. This shift paints the Chechen attackers in 
a much different light than in previous coverage in that it obscures the legitimate political roots 
of the separatist movement. However small these examples are, they serve to represent a shifting 
trend in the Journal’s coverage that will continue into the reporting of the Beslan coverage. 
A continuation of the Journal’s Dubrovka Crisis coverage is present in the “impersonal 
depiction of victims” and detached reporting of the Metro Bombing. However, this detached 
presentation of the attack is just as likely a result of the small amount of coverage than a 
representation of any journalistic method or inherent bias. Nevertheless, the Journal’s 
presentation of the victims within its coverage is limited to one statement describing how, “a 
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bomb ripped through a packed Moscow subway train… killing 39 passengers.”234 Much like in 
previous coverage, the main focus of the Journal’s detached reporting remains the political and 
economic repercussions of the attack rather than the experience of the victims. 
As expected, the points of view presented in the Wall Street Journal’s reporting, while 
very limited, provide more of a Russian perspective. Much of the Journal’s small coverage is 
devoted to the specific political and security response in response to the attack within Russia. It 
describes the calls for an improved security infrastructure and the rise of doubts about Putin’s 
ability to protect the country from terrorism. Accompanying these statements is the description 
of a “revived sense of vulnerability” among Muscovites that presents the heightened fears within 
Russia in response to the violence.235 Additionally, while Putin’s claims that the bombing was “a 
Chechen bid to disrupt March 14 voting” in the upcoming election, no such attention is given to 
the Chechen separatist authority, which, as previously noted, denied responsibility for the 
attack.236 Overall, although this lack of Chechen perspective cannot be claimed to be 
representative of the entire post-9/11 coverage, it still represents a troubling trend that threatens 
to provide readers with an incomplete understanding of the conflict. 
The limited nature of the Journal’s Metro Bombing coverage also results in a very 
limited context surrounding the event. What is striking about this limited context is that it makes 
no mention of the historical nature of the Russo-Chechen conflict at all. Instead, the only context 
compares Russia’s experience of long-term terrorism with that of Israel. The brief section 
compares the security measures adopted by each country, and criticizes Russia for its poor 
                                                 
234 "World Watch." Wall Street Journal, Feb 09, 2004, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/398879757?accountid=14709. 
235 Ibid. 
236 "World-Wide." Wall Street Journal, Feb 09, 2004, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/398873654?accountid=14709. 
 87 
infrastructure.237 The danger of this comparison is that it seems to suggest a validation of Putin’s 
claims that the Russo-Chechen conflict is part of a global struggle against terrorism rather than a 
long-standing dispute over independence. 
Overall, the thin nature of the Wall Street Journal’s Metro Bombing reporting makes the 
drawing of larger conclusions from the coverage difficult. However, the frames of representation 
present in the articles still serve as a connection in the trend of the Journal’s shifting post-9/11 
perspective. Additionally, readers of the Metro Bombing coverage are still provided with a much 
different depiction of the conflict, one characterized by unwarranted Chechen terrorism rather 
than an increasingly violent separatist struggle. 
3.3 BESLAN SCHOOL HOSTAGE CRISIS 
On September 1, 2004, some 40 heavily armed Chechen guerillas seized a school amidst its first 
day ceremonies in the town of Beslan in southern Russia and took over 1,100 hostages, including 
777 children. The attackers forced the hostages into the school’s gymnasium, wired the building 
with explosives, and constructed large amounts of defenses.238 Over a three-day period, tense 
negotiations took place. The Chechens demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops and denied 
any offers of food or water for the child hostages.239 On the third day of the crisis, gunfire and 
explosions broke out as disorganized Russian security forces stormed the school. Although 
Russian officials claimed the fighting was initiated by the guerillas, many other groups, 
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including many of the Beslan children’s parents, placed the blame on Russian forces. In the end, 
nearly 380 people, including 186 children, died in the fighting.240 Although the failed rescue 
drew large amounts of domestic criticism, sympathy for the victims was widespread, including in 
the US.241 
The extent and depth of the coverage of the Beslan School Hostage Crisis is similar to 
that of the Dubrovka Hostage Crisis in 2002. As such, the Beslan coverage represents the 
culmination of the trends of shifting perspectives present within the post-9/11 reporting of the 
three publications. In order to draw accurate conclusions on the nature of the coverage of the 
Beslan Crisis, this author has carefully read and selected examples from the reporting to provide 
an effective depiction of the dominant frames of representation existent in the coverage as a 
whole.  
3.3.1 THE NEW YORK TIMES 
The New York Times coverage of the Beslan School Hostage Crisis presents a significantly 
different depiction of the conflict than that presented by the Times’ pre-9/11 coverage. The 
pattern of frames of representation governing the Times’ Beslan reporting is almost an exact 
opposite of the one showcased by the pre-9/11 coverage. In order to accurately present this shift, 
this author has identified the most striking and prevalent examples of the change, which are 
drawn directly from the reporting of the event. 
                                                 
240 Askerov, Historical Dictionary of the Chechen Conflict, 67. 




The first striking change in the Time’s reporting, which represents the culmination of a 
post-9/11 trend in labeling, is the near exclusive utilization of the “Chechen attackers as 
terrorists” frame as opposed to the more careful presentation of “Chechen attackers as 
separatists”. In fact, the “Chechen attackers as separatists” frame is all but absent from the 
Times’ coverage, appearing in only a small number of articles. Examples of these articles 
continue to use labels like “heavily armed fighters,” “militants,” and “hostage-takers,” but these 
terms provide little identity to the attackers and are overwhelmed by the much more dominant 
label of “terrorist.”242 Other articles use a combination of labels including “insurgents”, 
“guerillas,” and “terrorists” in order to break up the monotony of “terrorist” as a label, but 
unfortunately this does little in providing readers with a more balanced understanding of the 
conflict.243 
More so than in any of the New York Times’ previous coverage, the use of the “Chechen 
attackers as terrorists” frame of representation within the Beslan reporting is ubiquitous. For 
example, one of the first articles after the violent end of the crisis repeatedly uses the phrases, 
“terrorists teased their child captives,” “terrorists also spoke of politics,” and “a terrorist shot him 
in the forehead.”244 Other articles describe how the “terrorists had shoved out dead hostages” and 
that “one of the terrorists had been detained by the F.S.B.” years before the attack.245 Still 
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another describes the connections between the “Beslan terrorists” and other terrorist groups 
throughout Europe.246 Although the acts committed by the militants of the Beslan Crisis are 
among the most heinous and immoral imaginable, the exclusive use of “terrorist” in labeling the 
event creates issues of journalistic balance. Not only does the stigma surrounding “terrorist” 
serve to inhibit any deeper understanding of the nature Chechen cause or experience within the 
conflict, it also precludes any notion of peaceful negotiation as a solution to the event or the 
larger conflict, given the common assertion that diplomacy with those labeled “terrorists” is 
impossible. As a result of this, readers of the Times’ coverage are presented with a picture of the 
Chechen cause that is stripped of its nationalist separatist ambitions, and is instead characterized 
by unjustified and irreconcilable violence.  
A clear representation of the established supremacy of “terrorist” as a label appears in an 
editorial piece by the Times. Although the piece serves to illustrate a Chechen perspective of the 
conflict and place the tragedy of Beslan within the context of a long-standing and violent 
historical dispute, the attackers are almost exclusively referred to as “terrorists.”247 This example 
illustrates that “terrorist” has become the accepted label within which the conflict is framed in 
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the Times’ coverage. The Times thereby presents the conflict to readers through the frame of 
terrorism and counterterrorism rather than through a frame that highlights the much more 
complex political and cultural roots to the conflict. The term “terrorist” provides the reader with 
a seemingly well-defined picture of the good and evil sides of a conflict. However, as with the 
Russo-Chechen conflict in general, assigning these labels in a long-term, brutal conflict that has 
been characterized by violence against civilians on both sides is not so simple. In the end, the 
picture of Chechen attackers provided by the New York Times’ post-9/11 coverage of the Beslan 
Crisis is much more sinister than the depiction of the Chechens before September 11, 2001. 
Another continued post-9/11 trend within the Times’ Beslan Crisis coverage is the heavy 
use of the “personal depiction of victims” frame of representation. In fact, the instances of victim 
narration, scene setting, and graphic detailing are so numerous and intense throughout the Times’ 
coverage that presenting the totality of this coverage is impossible in this study. Instead, this 
author has attempted to isolate several of the most representative examples of these personal 
representations in order to provide a valid illustration of the nature of the reporting.  
One example of victim narration provides the story of two parents whose two daughters 
were hostages. The article describes how the mother, Mrs. Arkova, watched her children leave 
for school with a group of children carrying balloons as part of the first day celebration only to 
see “dozens of multicolored balloons rising through the schoolyard’s trees” after the gunfire 
began.248 The article goes on to describe the frantic and desperate attempts by Mrs. Arkova and 
her husband to reach their children only to be turned away by police and left waiting “in the 
deflated calm of helplessness.”249 Another article highlights the victims’ experience within the 
school, using several different testimonies to narrate the three days of the crisis. The piece 
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graphically depicts the hostages’ experience, describing how the air was “steaming hot and foul-
smelling with worry, urine, and sweat,” and captures the chaos of the final battle through the 
perspective of a young school girl who “ran wildly” while next to her “a boy who was running 
with his sister was struck.”250 It is difficult to capture the imagery and emotion captured in these 
articles, which present readers with a dark and terrifying glimpse into the victims of the attack. 
More examples of the graphic nature of the Times’ coverage can be seen in several 
articles describing the aftermath of the Beslan Crisis. One provides a particularly in-depth 
depiction of a mother searching the school after the attack for her missing child: 
She entered the nearly empty cafeteria and passed through it, and proceeded even to the 
kitchen and pantries, to the last unlit and darkened corner, screaming and sobbing, pulling 
herself up over the rubble to look for him behind a refrigerator that had been knocked on 
its side. She found nothing, and wandered out, filling the room with piercing, 
incomprehensible cries.251 
Passages like this present the reader with a very powerful and personal image of the pain 
and suffering felt by the victims of the Beslan Crisis. Another article describes the scene at 
Beslan’s overflowing morgue, “A mother in a red and white blouse knelt on the ground, weeping 
as she kissed her dead daughter’s face.”252 A third article paints a similar picture, stating, 
“unclaimed children lying dead… beside the tiny bodies of classmates whose mothers knelt in 
the grass, stroking their blood-matted hair.”253 Readers of the Times’ coverage are thus drawn 
into the tragic and emotional response to the attack, and are provided an avenue through which 
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they may understand and sympathize with the Beslan victim’s experience. Additionally, the 
graphic nature of the descriptions provides readers with a powerful and lasting image of Russian 
suffering than anything previously offered in the Times’ coverage of the Russo-Chechen conflict. 
Still more articles by the Times focus on the response to the attacks throughout Russia 
and abroad, even informing readers of different methods through which they can express 
sympathy. One such article follows several Ossetian families who were forced to travel to 
Moscow in order to acquire burn treatment for their families. The article describes the grieving 
of the helpless families and describes their support for each other, and by strangers from the local 
community, several of whom brought gifts and money to the hospital.254 Several other articles 
describe the wave of sympathy and support throughout Russia and the West, even comparing the 
Russian response to the atmosphere present in the US following the attacks of September 11th.255 
Another article quotes a Russian embassy official describing the overwhelming amount of 
support, “It’s not the point, how much money. It’s the reaction of the Americans.” The article 
also includes a list of relief organizations available for donations for support of Beslan.256 In this 
way, the Times’ Beslan Crisis coverage evokes a sense of shared experience and empathy with 
the victims of the attack that is more significant than in any of the previous coverage, especially 
the pre-9/11 coverage. As a result, readers are able to relate to and comprehend the magnitude of 
the Russian suffering. 
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A personal depiction of the Chechen victims does occur in one Times’ article that 
discusses several of the female Chechen bombers and speculates as to the experiences that may 
have led to their attacks.257 However, this single article fails to influence the dominant discourse 
within the coverage, which is one that presents the Russian victims of the conflict in a very 
personal, human, and sympathetic light. 
Overall, the “personal depiction of victims” dominates the New York Times’ Beslan 
School Hostage Crisis reporting more than in any of the other coverage analyzed in this work. 
This is a striking shift from the paper’s pre-9/11 stance. 
Another trend continued in the Times’ Beslan Crisis coverage is the dominance of the 
“Russian POV” frame of representation over the “Chechen POV”. Although, the Chechen 
perspective does appear in several editorial and commentary pieces as well as a few regular 
articles, the overriding viewpoint throughout most of the reporting is the Russian POV. 
Examples can be found in all of the personal articles identified above as well as in much of the 
rest of the coverage. As only Russian officials are quoted in the vast majority of the articles, a 
Chechen voice is difficult to find.258 Additionally, other articles discuss the reactions of Russian 
citizens to the Beslan Crisis. For example, one piece which discusses a music telethon put on by 
a Russian television channel in order to raise relief funds describes the somber mood and rallying 
of support by the Russian in the aftermath of the crisis.259 One piece highlights Russia’s struggle 
with “repeated Chechen terrorist attacks,” and encourages Western support of Putin’s policies in 
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Chechnya.260 A final major example of the prevalence of the Russian point of view in the Times’ 
coverage is the transcription and publishing of Putin’s televised speech from the Kremlin after 
the conclusion of the Beslan Crisis.261 Publishing Putin’s speech directly provides the readers of 
the Times with a look into the Russian understanding and reaction to the conflict that is much 
more thorough than any Chechen perspective provided by the paper. Although it is unsurprising 
that the Times stresses the “Russian POV,” failing to balance possible alternative perspectives of 
the conflict presents readers with an incomplete and biased understanding of the dispute as a 
whole. 
Despite the prevalence of the “Russian POV” frame in the Beslan Crisis coverage, the 
Times continues to provide a detailed, albeit minor, representation of the “Chechen POV” in 
some of its reporting. Examples of the use of this perspective can be formed in several articles 
discussing the political aftermath of the Beslan Crisis. One article acknowledges “years of war 
and atrocities that have left the Chechen people embittered.”262 Another briefly mentions pleas 
from human rights groups calling for the Russian government to “address the root causes of the 
separatist conflict in Chechnya.”263 Although these present a more balanced view of the conflict, 
their brevity reduces their potential impact on readers.  
The most substantial example of an acknowledgement of the Chechen perspective of the 
conflict appears in an article discussing the historical background of the fighting. Rather than 
only present the Russian side of the story, the article includes an interview with a Chechen leader 
and quotes his criticism of Russian tactics in Chechnya: “You must agree that the elimination of 
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one-fourth of the population is not the struggle against terrorism.”264 An equally effective article 
at presenting the Chechen perspective analyzes the stories of several of the Chechen female 
bombers, providing their backgrounds in an attempt to understand the motivations behind their 
decisions.265 However, these articles constitute a distinct minority within the Times’ narrative of 
the Beslan Crisis.  
The only other presentation of Chechen viewpoints found in the Times’ reporting of the 
Beslan Crisis is within two commentary pieces discussing the event and potential solutions to the 
ongoing conflict. These articles acknowledge the “brutal history of Russian oppression of 
Chechens,” as well as the fact that Chechen separatists are seeking “the limited objective of 
independence.”266 In this way, these commentaries provide readers with a sense of the conflict 
that acknowledges the violence by both sides and the historical roots of the dispute. However, 
despite the effective representation of the Chechen perspective in these articles, they are 
statistically insignificant compared to the Russian-dominated view of Beslan and the overall 
conflict present in the rest of the Times’ coverage.  
A final trend continued within the New York Times’ post-9/11 coverage is the 
combination of “context of historical conflict” and “context of wave of terror” frames of 
representation. However, despite the rise of the “wave of terror” as a concept in the paper’s 
reporting, much of the Times’ coverage continues to retain a historical background of the conflict 
as its main contextualization. Examples of this are visible in several articles, which make brief 
mentions to the wars in Chechnya when grounding the Beslan Crisis in a larger narrative. One 
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such article states,  “The attack on the school in Beslan, in southern Russia, was the latest and 
most disturbing of a series of terror attacks that are apparently linked to the decadelong separatist 
war in Chechnya.”267 In this way, readers understand that the Beslan attack, like others before it, 
is not a result of random or unexplainable violence, but the culmination of a long and brutal 
rebellion. Another similar article describes, “The war between Russia and Chechen separatists, 
characterized by terrorist bombs, abductions, assassinations and brutality by both sides, had 
descended so deeply into inhumanity that much of the world had turned away.”268 Context like 
this supplies readers with a more informed understanding of the violent historical nature of the 
Russo-Chechen conflict, and situates the Beslan Crisis within a timeline of that violence.269  
One article by the Times delves even deeper into the historical narrative of the conflict. 
This commentary piece describes the history of the dispute from the deportation under Stalin 
through the First and Second Russo-Chechen Wars, citing that “Chechens have been battling 
their Russian conquerors for centuries.”270 This type of context not only provides a historical 
understanding of the conflict, but also serves to acknowledge the Chechen experience within the 
fighting. However, despite these reports and in contrast to the pre-9/11 coverage, much of the 
Times’ reporting of the Beslan Crisis plays down, or even drops, the historical context altogether 
in favor of one focused on terror.  
As the above examples imply, several of the pieces from the Times’ Beslan Crisis 
coverage offers a hybrid contextualization of the event, acknowledging both the antiquity of the 
Russo-Chechen conflict as well as the rise of the newfound notion of international terrorism. For 
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example, one editorial attributes the Beslan Crisis to “a global terrorist jihad,” which “flows 
across national borders,” while simultaneously acknowledging that “Chechen hostility to Russia 
goes back centuries” and “turned even more venomous after Stalin deported the entire Chechen 
population.”271 While this dichotomous presentation of contexts offers readers a historical 
understanding of the conflict, it also asserts the threat of an international terrorist conspiracy, a 
claim that the Times confined to Russian officials in the pre-9/11 coverage. Several other articles 
contrast “claims that the separatist movement was fueled by groups like Al Qaeda” with 
quotations by critics of the international terrorism.272 One such quotation from a Russian 
newspaper describes that blaming the attack on international terrorism “allows governments all 
over the world not to assume their responsibilities for the deaths of their citizens.”273 Although 
mixed contexts continue to give readers a view into the historical aspects of the Russo-Chechen 
conflict, the rising validation of the “wave of terror” context continues to represents a shift from 
the Times’ pre-9/11 reporting.  
Further, several articles covering the Beslan Crisis provide readers with only the “context 
of wave of terror” frame of representation. Rather than highlight the ongoing fighting in 
Chechnya, these pieces frame the Beslan attack within the context of “the vicious world of 
terrorism.”274 Another example of this type of background is exhibited by a commentary piece 
that states that the Beslan attack was “initiated by terrorist groups outside Russia.”275 Although 
less common than the hybrid or historical contexts, these examples still serve to instill in readers 
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an understanding that the Beslan Crisis is part of a new global plague, rather than tied to a much 
more complex and longstanding historical and cultural dispute. As such, readers come to 
understand the Russo-Chechen conflict as “beyond negotiation” and only solvable by the 
destruction of one side.276 
Overall, the coverage of the Beslan School Hostage Crisis by the New York Times offers 
a clear example of the culmination of shifting trends in the Times’ post 9/11 coverage. The rising 
domination of the “Chechen attackers as terrorists”, “personal depiction of victims”, and 
“Russian POV” frames of representation provide readers with a reality of the Russo-Chechen 
conflict that is much less well-rounded and informed than the reality espoused in the pre-9/11 
coverage. Additionally, the rising influence of the “context of wave of terror” frame illustrates a 
trend within the coverage that serves to bury the historical and political roots of the dispute, and 
thus handicap potential outlooks for a peaceful resolution. 
3.3.2 THE WASHINGTON POST 
As with the New York Times, the Washington Post’s coverage of the Beslan School Hostage 
Crisis represents the culmination of the publication’s shifting perspectives in the post-9/11 
period. Consequently, the pattern of frames of representation exhibited by the Post’s Beslan 
Crisis reporting is much different than that present in the paper’s pre-9/11 coverage. In order to 
illustrate these changes, this author has selected specific examples that will most accurately 
represent the nature of the Post’s Beslan Crisis as a whole. 
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The first shift represented in the Washington Post’s Beslan Crisis coverage is the rising 
prevalence of the “Chechen attackers as terrorists” frame of representation as compared to the 
“Chechen attackers as separatists” label. More so than in any of the paper’s previous coverage, 
the Post’s Beslan Crisis reporting contains frequent use of “terrorist” both as an indicator of 
tactics and of the attackers themselves. Several examples of these articles narrate the events of 
the Beslan Crisis from the perspective of the hostages, stating, “terrorists with guns burst into 
their school,” and “one of the terrorists taunted the hostages.”277 Others pieces retrospectively 
use the label, declaring “condemnation of the acts that Chechen terrorists have inflicted.”278 
These depictions strip the attackers of any potential motivation, and thus fail to help readers 
understand the nature of the conflict. Additionally, despite the dominance of other labels within 
the Post’s coverage, the increasing inclusion of the term “terrorist” represents a shift in the 
accepted dominant discourse surrounding the conflict. 
Yet much of the Post’s coverage preserves the pre-9/11 strategy of relegating “terrorist” 
to quotations by officials or descriptions of tactics rather than people. A representative example 
of this reporting makes reference to the Russian officials’ use of labels (“Putin blamed 
international terrorists”), but maintains distance from this claim and counters it by referring to 
the attackers as “guerillas,” “heavily armed insurgents,” and “hostage-takers” throughout the rest 
of the article.279 In this way, readers are presented with the official Russian perspective of the 
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attack without being forced to operate within the bounds of Russian discourse. Other articles use 
terror frequently as a label, but avoid burying the Chechen identity within the conflict by labeling 
the tactics rather than the attackers. These articles label the attack in Beslan as a “terrorist strike”, 
“terrorist attack”, or simply as “terrorism” in general.280 Thus, although this still represents a rise 
in the post-9/11 pervasiveness of “terrorist” as a general term, the Post’s adoption of the 
discourse better preserves the identity of the attackers. 
Another way that the Post’s preserves the Chechen identity is the use of “terrorists” as a 
distinct group separate from the larger and more moderate Chechen separatist movement. While 
these articles use “terrorist” as a label in reference to the Beslan attackers, this attribution is 
coupled with a plea for people “to distinguish between genuine Chechen nationalists and the 
terrorists.”281 In this way the reporting strongly condemns the Beslan attackers, while also 
pointing readers toward a more comprehensive understanding of the greater Russo-Chechen 
conflict.  
Finally, as in the previous coverage, much of the Post’s Beslan Crisis avoids the 
controversy of the “terrorist” label by simply avoiding the term altogether. Similar to the 
Dubrovka Crisis coverage, the main labels for the attackers espoused in these articles are 
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“guerillas,” “Chechen rebels,” and “hostage takers.”282 Thus, this presentation of the attackers 
illustrates the nature of the attack while not burying of the political roots the conflict through the 
destruction of Chechen identity.283  
Overall, the Washington Post’s labeling of the attackers within the Beslan Crisis 
represents a continuity of the shifts present in the previous post-9/11 reporting. While the Post 
preserves a sense of the political nature of the dispute through several methods, the label 
“terrorist” becomes more prevalent in the coverage of the conflict. 
Another trend in frames of representation that is sustained in the Post’s Beslan Crisis 
coverage is the dominance of the “personal depiction of victims” frame. Much like with the New 
York Times, the Post’s Beslan coverage utilizes a combination of individual narratives and 
graphic detail to provide a much more personalized presentation of the event than in any of the 
paper’s previous coverage. 
An example of this type of coverage is visible in the Post’s use of personal narratives in 
order to describe the beginning of the crisis. One such article follows the narrative of two 
children who fled the initial assault, describing their fear as the attackers “stormed through the 
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schoolyard…barking orders at hundreds of students and parents.”284 Another article portrays the 
hostage taking from the perspective of those outside the school. It describes one woman who 
received a call from a loved one in the school screaming, “They are shooting! They are 
shooting!” before the call disconnected.285 Such vivid descriptions not only provide readers with 
a more personal presentation of the victims themselves, but also allow readers to experience the 
horror of the attack through the eyes of those at the scene. 
This type of narration is visible in the Post’s reporting on the final battle of the Beslan 
Crisis. One article describes the experience of a history teacher in the school, Nadezhda Gurieva. 
“Gurieva’s 11-year old daughter fell dead in the first explosion and her son Boris, 14, was 
seriously wounded… she was unable to move him.”286 Another piece follows the perspective of 
Sosik Parastayev, a fourth-grade student at the school, who was with his mother and brother 
when an explosion shattered a window nearby: “as she tried to clear the broken glass from the 
window so the boys could leap out, Sosik said, a bullet sliced through the air and ripped into her 
body.”287 Reporting like this draws readers into the reality of the horror of the event and hence 
evokes much greater sympathy than alternative presentations. 
Like the New York Times, the Post also makes use of graphic details in presenting readers 
with images of the crisis. One article describing the chaos of the rescue describes, “A man came 
out carrying a naked girl, her hair matted, her body streaked with shrapnel cuts, her head lolled 
back. He laid her on the ground and tried to revive her. When she didn’t respond, he started to 
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cry.”288 Another describes the wreckage of the school in the aftermath of the battle: “Amid all 
the charred rubble, it was the shoes that somehow stood out. A burned black sneaker near the 
wall. A soiled white slipper with faux jewelry. A girl’s toeless sandal. A woman’s pump. And 
somehow, each without its mate.”289 The vivid imagery provided by these articles allows readers 
to more easily imagine and comprehend the violence and destruction that occurred in the school. 
The descriptions also provide a much more personal look into the experiences of the victims, 
both alive and dead.  
The Post also provides very personal coverage of the grieving process after the Beslan 
Crisis, thereby offering a more sympathetic view than had been the case before. Several articles 
describe the funeral process in Beslan. One reported that: “In one five-minute period… 14 
coffins arrived in succession.” It goes on to narrate how the destruction affected several specific 
families, before closing with a quote from one of the grave-diggers stating, “We will work until 
dark… There are many more to bury.”290 Readers are not only drawn into the horrors of the 
attack, but also the dismal grief of the aftermath. 
A final example of the Post’s personal presentation of the Beslan Crisis can be found in 
the paper’s coverage of the widespread sympathy offered to the victims. Much like the Times, 
the Post devotes space to informing readers about ways to donate to the victims, and even 
includes an entire article discussing the sympathy shown by US citizens at the Russian 
                                                 
288 Baker and Glasser, "Russia School Siege Ends in Carnage; Hundreds Die as Troops Battle Hostage Takers." 
289 Peter Baker, "A Gruesome Tour Inside School no. 1; Beslan Residents Get First Look at the Wreckage." The 
Washington Post, Sep 06, 2004, http://search.proquest.com/docview/409732391?accountid=14709. 
290 Peter Finn and Susan B. Glasser, "Under a 'Crying' Sky, Beslan's Dead are Laid to Rest; Death Toll at 334; 200 
Still Missing." The Washington Post, Sep 07, 2004, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/409670504?accountid=14709; for another example of this type of coverage, see 
Glasser, "Russia Admits it Lied on Crisis; Public was Misled on Scale of Siege." 
 105 
embassy.291 The Post also published a commentary piece by the Russian Ambassador describing 
his thanks for the widespread support and calling for unity in the “common fight against 
terrorism.”292 In this way, the Post goes beyond any of its previous reporting in presenting a 
vivid and sympathetic picture of the attack and its victims. Further, by including an article about 
how to send relief to Beslan, the Post provides its readers with a way to directly interact with the 
victims and feel more connected and involved in their recovery from the attack. 
Overall, the Washington Post’s Beslan School Hostage Crisis coverage exemplifies a 
strong exhibition of the “personal depiction of victims” frame of representation that is much 
more powerful and thorough than in previous coverage, especially its pre-9/11 coverage. Readers 
are presented with a much deeper and more vivid understanding of the victims’ experiences of 
the attack than in the past, and as a result can more easily relate and sympathize with the victims 
and their reactions.  
Another trend that appears in the Post’s Beslan Crisis coverage is the decreasing 
presentation of the “Chechen POV” in order to balance out the Russian perspective within the 
reporting. Although the Chechen perspective is retained in a minority of articles, it receives 
much less attention than in comparison to the pre-9/11 reporting. As is exhibited in the wealth of 
examples above, most of the Beslan Crisis coverage is told through the narrative of Russian 
victims and officials. Without any Chechen perspective on the event and the conflict as a whole, 
readers of the Post receive a partial account of the dispute. Examples of the dominance of the 
Russian narrative exist in the very personal narrative of the event and conflict presented by the 
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Post.293 A telling example of this dominance is a commentary piece by the Russian Ambassador. 
The ambassador’s writing presents a purely Russian perspective to readers, claiming that any 
change to Russian policy in Chechnya would be giving into the demands of terrorists.294 
However, no perspective from a Chechen leader is ever presented to counter this piece. 
Nevertheless, the Post’s coverage does provide several articles that exhibit a more 
balanced presentation of Chechen and Russian perspectives. The vast majority of such pieces 
appear in the editorial and commentary sections. For example, one piece balances its sympathy 
for the Russian suffering from Beslan with an acknowledgment that “Russia’s abominable 
behavior” has driven many Chechen’s to extremisim.295 Another acknowledges that the Russian 
government is “allowing Russian troops to torture and torment Chechen civilians” has 
contributed to the cycle of violence within the conflict.296 A commentary piece even refers to a 
Chechen separatist leader’s statement that the labeling of the Second Russo-Chechen War as a 
“counter-terrorist operation” was a tactic “to discredit the idea of Chechen autonomy, and to link 
the rebels firmly with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.”297 Although few in numbers, the 
presentation of a counter-point to the Russian perspective provides reader with some insight into 
the experience and potential motivations for Chechen actors within the conflict. Perhaps the most 
rounded presentation of perspectives contrasts the use of “harsh occupation tactics, destroying 
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villages and rounding up prisoners” by the Russians to the Chechens increasing use of “suicide 
attacks on Russian civilian targets.”298 Here the violence and suffering that exist on both sides of 
the conflict are made clear to readers. However, these articles account for a small minority of the 
Washington Post’s Beslan Crisis coverage, and are greatly overpowered by the “Russian POV” 
frame. 
Overall, the Post’s reporting on the Beslan Crisis represents a marked shift from the 
frames of representation dominant in the pre-9/11 coverage. The diminishing presentation of a 
“Chechen POV” presents readers with a much different reality of the Russo-Chechen conflict. 
This is not to suggest that the reciprocity of violence justifies any of the tactics, but to assert that 
without an acknowledgement of the evils on both sides of the fighting, resolution of the conflict 
is highly unlikely. 
As with the Dubrovka Crisis coverage, the Washington Post maintains much more 
consistency in its presentation of contexts than does the New York Times in reporting the Beslan 
School Hostage Crisis. The Post’s dominant frame of representation remains the “context of 
historical conflict” frame, although the “context of wave of terror” is also present in a significant 
minority of the Post’s articles, which marks a distinct shift from the pre-9/11 coverage. An 
example of this representation appears in an article reporting Putin’s claims of Chechen linkages 
to al Qaeda by describing the “inordinately important role” played by the Chechens in a network 
of international terrorism.299 Another piece compares the Beslan Crisis to the US experience on 
September 11th, claiming that the US and Russian Federation are partners in the “mutual war 
against terror.”300 Such claims of a “common fight against terrorism” blur the distinctions 
                                                 
298 Hoffman, "Chechen Conflict Now Rages Beyond Russia's Expectations." 
299 Hoagland, "Putin's Misdirected Rage." 
300 Fan, "Brought Together by Grief; at Russian Embassy, Hundreds Express Sympathy for People of Beslan." 
 108 
between the US and Russian experiences with terror, and thus force the Chechen separatist 
movement into a category of modern global terror rather than an enduring nationalist struggle.301  
However, a majority of the Post’s coverage presents a mix of both potential contexts, 
often presenting Putin’s international terrorist narrative along with a representation of the 
criticism of such claims. An example of this type of hybrid coverage is demonstrated by one 
article that cites Russian officials as, “blaming the siege on international Islamic terrorists,” but 
counters this context by acknowledging criticism that this rhetoric represents an “effort to deflect 
attention” from Chechnya, “where a year of on-again, off-again war has brought about a wave of 
Chechen-related terrorism.”302 In this way, readers are presented with both perspectives on the 
context and can thus make informed judgments. One last example of this type of coverage 
presents the potential international origins of several of the hostage-takers, but it also offers the 
counter-narrative that the government may be exaggerating these connections in order to “claim 
to be fighting international terrorists rather than domestic nationalists.”303 Thus, rather than 
obscure the political and historical origins of the dispute, the Post protects these aspects by 
providing a counter-context to the one espoused by Russian officials. 
The vast majority of the Post’s Beslan Crisis coverage focuses its contextualization of the 
conflict on the historical events of the dispute, especially the separatist wars of the 1990s. 
Various articles describe how “war and upheaval have marked Chechnya for decades,” 
emphasizing the most recent expression of that violence in the “separatist rebellion” of the 1990s 
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and second war that followed.304 Several articles even describe the historical context of the 
dispute back to the times of the Russian Empire; the Post devoted an entire article to presenting 
background and history of the Russo-Chechen conflict.305 Several of the Post’s editorial and 
commentary pieces also provide readers with a deeper contextualization. One such piece 
describes the “nearly 10 years of brutal Russian-Chechen conflict in Chechnya,” while an 
editorial chastises Boris Yeltsin for his 1994 invasion of Chechnya, which inevitably “set off an 
endless and vicious circle of violence” by turning the Chechen capital “into a ghost town of 
corpses and rubble” and forcing thousands to flee the country.306 These examples of background 
information provide the Post’s readers with a reality of the Beslan Crisis that is well rounded and 
accurately situated within the context of a long and violent dispute.307  
Overall, the Washington Post’s Beslan School Hostage Crisis coverage exemplifies the 
shifting perspectives that occurred within its reporting over the post-9/11 period. The rising use 
of “terrorist” as a label and the growing influence of international terrorism as a context, even 
when subordinated by other frames, symbolizes a shifting trend in the discourse of the Russo-
Chechen conflict. Additionally, the massive increase in the personal presentation of the events, 
along with reduced coverage of the Chechen perspective, demonstrates a shift within the Post’s 
decision of how to present the conflict. As a result of this, readers of the Post’s post-9/11 
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coverage receive a much different picture of the Russo-Chechen conflict than painted in the pre-
9/11 coverage.  
3.3.3 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
Much like the reporting by the New York Times and Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal’s 
coverage of the Beslan School Hostage Crisis also presents a culmination of the shifting pattern 
of frames of representation within the Journal’s post-9/11 reporting. Thus, these major shifts 
represent a different understanding of the conflict than that presented in the Journal before and 
after the attacks of September 11th. In order to illustrate this shift, this author has selected 
appropriate examples from the Journal’s reporting that serve to characterize the paper’s coverage 
of the Beslan Crisis as a whole.  
One of the most striking shifts in the Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage is the sharp rise in 
the “Chechen attackers as terrorists” frame of representation, which had formerly been 
subordinated by “Chechen attackers as separatists.” Although some articles in the Journal refrain 
from using “terrorist” as a human label, the pervasiveness of the term represents a clear shift in 
the dominant discourse of the conflict. Examples of this shift can be found in several articles that 
describe the attack on the school. One article describes the “Islamic savagery” of the “terrorists 
who invaded Middle School No.1,” while another describes how, “terrorists wired the building 
with explosives and kept the hostages with little water and no food.”308 Although these 
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descriptions highlight the barbarity of the hostage takers, they have another side effect of 
dehumanizing the attackers and thus obscuring the experiences and motivations that have fueled 
the cyclic violence of the Russo-Chechen conflict. Thus, readers of the Journal’s Beslan Crisis 
coverage may receive a picture of the state of the conflict that is incomplete, ignoring the deep-
seeded issues behind the violence of Beslan. 
But several articles counter this labeling by presenting a distinction between the Chechen 
“terrorists” who attacked Beslan, and the wider and more legitimate separatist movement. One 
article describes the brutal tactics of the attackers, “terrorists deliberately targeted children,” but 
distinguishes these actions by acknowledging, “Moderate elements in Chechnya do exist.”309 
Although the reader receives a vague picture of a “terrorist” attacker, the Journal preserves the 
identity of the Chechen people and the larger separatist movement. One commentary piece 
couples its descriptions of the “Beslan terrorists” with a statement that “Chechnya’s broader 
separatist movement… is not made up of extremists.”310 In this way, the Journal provides its 
readers with a more rounded understanding of the conflict, and prevents the label of “terrorist” 
from burying the legitimate political nature of the dispute.  
A significant portion of the Journal’s coverage uses terror as a description not of the 
attackers themselves, but of their tactics and assaults. These articles use terror very frequently 
and in various forms, but rather than referring to the attackers, they describe the Beslan Crisis as 
“terrorism,” part of a “concerted campaign of terror” or one of several “major terrorist 
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strikes.”311  The attackers, who are described as “rebels” and “gunmen”, are able to retain a 
human identity and human qualities rather than becoming faceless mad men. Another example of 
distancing the Journal from the term appears in an article that notes that, “Putin still insists he 
won’t negotiate with what he calls terrorists,” while consistently describing the attackers as 
“rebels” and “militants.”312 In this way, the Journal makes clear that the label “terrorist” is one 
used by Russian officials and contrasts this presentation with one that leaves room for a more 
open understanding of the political nature of the conflict. However, it is telling that the use of 
“terrorist” as a label has risen to dominance in the Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage. 
Additionally, the pervasive use of “terrorist” (and other labels using this root), which is present 
in almost every single of the Journal’s articles, represents a major shift in the previously used 
rhetoric to describe the Russo-Chechen conflict. Overall, the rise in use of the “Chechen 
attackers as terrorists” label tends to obscure the root causes of Russo-Chechen violence for 
readers. 
In contrast to the New York Times’ and Washington Post’s reporting, the narrative of 
victims and detailed description of the attack and aftermath are entirely absent from the Wall 
Street Journal’s coverage. However, although the Journal does not include a single interview 
with any witness or victim of the attack in its Beslan Crisis coverage, there is a notable increase 
in the graphic detail paid to the victim’s experience. For example, one article illustrates the 
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experience of the children stating, “their captors denied them so much as a sip of water.”313 
Another describes the bloody aftermath of the attack, “there is nothing left of what were once the 
school’s children -- only pieces.”314 Several other of the Journal’s articles also include graphic 
imageries of the event.315 Although these descriptions are a far cry from the graphic portrayals 
provided by the New York Times and Washington Post, they still represent a major shift from the 
entirely detached nature of the Journal’s pre-9/11 coverage. Further, readers of the Journal are 
presented with a much more engaging and vivid picture of the event and its victims than in any 
previous reporting, and thus are able to understand and sympathize more strongly with those 
affected by it. 
However, despite this increase in graphic content, the majority of the Wall Street 
Journal’s coverage retains the detached style that characterizes the paper’s previous coverage. 
These articles acknowledge the outcome of the event with statements such as, “the school siege 
in the Southern Russian city of Beslan… ended in a bloodbath Friday that left more than 300 
people dead, nearly half of them children.”316 However, no further attention is paid to the victims 
as the bulk of the reporting focuses on the political repercussions of the attack and responses 
from Russian officials.317 One article even devotes equal time to economic responses to the 
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attack: “Leading Russian business groups yesterday pledged to keep the economy going.”318 This 
type of reporting presents readers with a much more distant and obscure perception of the event 
than the depictions of the other papers. 
Overall, the “personal depiction of victims” within the Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage, 
however miniscule in comparison to the other publications, still represents a shift in the pattern 
of frames of representation previously found in the paper. Additionally, as a result of this shift, 
readers are provided with a more personal depiction of the nature of the event and its victims 
than in the pre-9/11 coverage. Another notable shift in the Wall Street Journal’s Beslan Crisis 
coverage is the notable decrease in presentation of the “Chechen POV” frame of representation. 
In fact, the Russian narrative becomes the dominant frame through which the Journal presents 
the Beslan Crisis and conflict as a whole.  
Brief demonstrations of the Chechen perspective are evident in several of the Journal’s 
commentary pieces. One such piece describes the “endless horrors” of Chechen prison camps 
and notes that, “there is a fullscale genocide taking place” by “Kremlin-backed bandits who are 
no different from the terrorists.”319 In this way, the piece highlights the horrors and violence 
suffered on the Chechen side of the conflict in order to balance a purely Russian perspective of 
the fighting. Another piece highlights the moderate nature of the vast majority of the Chechen 
people, citing that extremists “have broadly failed to win Chechens over to their side.” The 
article goes on to describe the “dozens of calls for a peaceful, negotiated solution to the conflict” 
offered by the separatist movement.320 In this way, the presentation of the separatist movement 
by Russian officials, which typically generalizes Chechens as nonnegotiable extremists, is 
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countered by a distinctly different point of view.321 However, these examples of the “Chechen 
POV” frame of representation do not effectively mitigate against the dominant narrative 
provided by the Journal, as the vast majority of coverage exhibits a purely Russian perspective 
of the Beslan Crisis and surrounding conflict. 
The majority of the Journal’s reporting, including almost all of its actual news articles, 
neglects to balance the dominant Russian voice with a Chechen voice. In these articles, Russian 
officials and analysts tell the narrative of the Beslan Crisis and its aftermath within Russian 
politics.322 Examples of this type of narrative include comments like “Chechen extremists have 
turned increasingly to terrorist attacks against Russian civilians” and discuss the reactions of the 
Russian government, quoting Putin’s call for “an organized and united civil society” in the wake 
of the violence.323 Another describes how “Russia took to the streets to protest terrorism,” calling 
for increased security measures and improvements in law enforcement.324 Although this 
perspective is unsurprising given the ease of access to Russian sources, and the location and 
nature of the attack, by diminishing the Chechen representation of the conflict, the Journal 
provides its readers with a perception of the dispute that more strictly aligns with Russian views. 
As a result, readers of the Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage may remain uninformed as to the 
root causes of the fighting and are much less likely to understand the cyclical nature of violence 
in the conflict than in past reporting. 
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A final representation of shifting trends in the Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage appears 
in the rising dominance of the “context of wave of terror” frame over top of the “context of 
historical conflict.” Indeed, although the historical background of the dispute is commonplace in 
the Journal’s Dubrovka Crisis reporting, in the Beslan coverage it is reduced to a small number 
of commentary pieces. One such article begins its context with Stalin’s deportation of Chechens 
during the World War Two and traces the history of Chechnya’s separatist struggle through the 
tumultuous 1990s and into the contemporary era, where the movement has split between a 
“radical terrorist network” and the legitimate “broader separatist movement.”325 This type of 
contextualization presents a reality of the Russo-Chechen conflict that is grounded in a war for 
national independence and a longstanding cycle of increasingly brutal fighting. A similar piece 
begins its contextualization with the Chechen declaration of independence in 1991, and describes 
the brutal nature Russo-Chechen Wars, especially Putin’s ongoing second invasion in which, 
“Russian forces have launched a campaign of terror in Chechnya, arresting, torturing and 
murdering thousands of Chechen men.”326 This detailed background provides readers with a 
much less one-sided perspective of the conflict, and acknowledges the atrocities committed by 
both sides. However, this historical contextualization is only prevalent in a small number of the 
Journal’s articles. The majority exhibits either a hybrid context or one that is based on the 
phenomenon of international terrorism. 
Examples of a combination of contexts are present in several of the Journal’s articles. 
One such piece mixes a description of the second invasion of Chechnya in 1999 with a depiction 
of a “terror wave” in Russia, even going as far as including a timeline of terror attacks from the 
                                                 
325 Karatnycky, "Weekend Journal; Taste -- Houses of Worship: Blood and Belief." 
326 Satter, "A Small Town in Russia;" for another example of historical contextualization, see Kasparov, "Putin must 
Go." 
 117 
September Apartment Bombings until the present.327 Another exemplary article describes the 
Beslan Crisis as part of the “war against terrorism” and describes the international nature of 
terrorism while also presenting the effect of the Second Russo-Chechen War as a “futile 
campaign of destruction,” which served to “strengthen the resolve of the Chechen insurgents.”328 
In this way, readers are introduced to both potential contexts and are able to glean an 
understanding of the conflict’s contemporary history. However, most of the Journal’s coverage 
disregards the historical aspects of the dispute, favoring only the “wave of terror” 
contextualization. 
The bulk of the Wall Street Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage favors a more contemporary 
context for the Russo-Chechen conflict, one that is based on international terrorism rather than 
separatist ambitions. In these articles, rather than being characterized as part of a long and brutal 
war, the Beslan Crisis is described as part of a “rain of terror [sic.]” or  “wave of terrorist 
attacks.”329 Additionally, these pieces describe “assistance from international terrorist groups” 
supporting the terror acts.330 Readers are led to understand the Beslan Crisis as part of a modern 
phenomenon of unjustified violence as opposed to the escalation of decades of bloodshed and 
oppression. Similar contexts are presented by a commentary and editorial piece. In the former, 
the attack is placed within the context of “9/11 World,” which the author describes as the 
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“constant murdering of people engaged in the mere act of urban life.”331 The article goes on to 
describe the connections between the attack in Beslan and other terrorist acts from “New York to 
Moscow, Madrid to Jakarta, Jerusalem, Rome, Nepal and Fallujah.”332  This type of conflation 
buries any historical or political roots of the Russo-Chechen conflict by tying the Chechens 
tightly into a stigma of international terrorism and demolishes any sort of individual identity. An 
editorial describes the Beslan Crisis as part of the “war on terror” and describes the “current age 
in which innocents are targeted by Muslim terrorists.”333 The article goes on to describe the 
Beslan attackers: “the murderers were Chechens, aided by Arabs believed to be allied with al 
Qaeda.”334 Not only is this description inaccurate (there were no Arabs involved in the Beslan 
Crisis), but it also blinds readers to the real root causes of the Russo-Chechen conflict in favor of 
a conspiracy of international terror against the West. Overall, the domination of this “context of 
wave of terror” in the Wall Street Journal’s Beslan Crisis coverage presents a major shift from 
previous reporting that provided readers with a much more sharply focused understanding of 
events and their place within the broader Russo-Chechen dispute. 
Like the New York Times and the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal’s presentation 
of the Beslan School Hostage Crisis represents the culmination of shifting perspectives in the 
post-9/11 era. The increased exhibition of “terrorist” as a label and rise of graphic descriptions of 
the attack provides readers with a very different picture of the conflict than ever before. 
Additionally, the decline of Chechen perspective within the coverage along with a 
contextualization that favors international terrorism over historical background creates an image 
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of the Russo-Chechen conflict that buries the roots of separatist ambitions and cyclical brutality 
that led to the Beslan Crisis. 
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4.0  CONCLUSION 
Based on this analysis’ examination of the shifting nature of the New York Times’, Washington 
Post’s, and Wall Street Journal’s coverage of the Russo-Chechen conflict before and after 9/11, 
several conclusions deserve to be highlighted. Although this paper is limited in scope, its 
conclusions contribute to the larger study of the inherent bias of media sources, and the ways in 
which events may in turn influence and change that bias. 
Most importantly, this analysis demonstrates the major impact that the events of 
September 11, 2001 had on the interpretations of the Russo-Chechen conflict by each of the three 
newspapers. The coverage provided by the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street 
Journal in the pre-9/11 era offered an interpretation of the terrorist attacks that was impersonal, 
that balanced the presentation of perspectives, and that preserved the historical and political roots 
of the Russo-Chechen conflict. However, in the post-9/11 reporting of the newspapers, there was 
a notable change.  
After the 9/11 attacks, the newspapers relied on the use of the label of “terrorist” to 
describe the alleged attackers after 9/11. The risk of this shift is that rather than present the 
alleged attackers as actors within a historical conflict focused on national identity and 
independence (as was the case in the pre-9/11 coverage), the newspapers instead presented an 
interpretation in which the attackers are devoid of legitimate historical motives and a cultural 
identity.  The increasing use of the label terrorist in relations to the Chechen attackers after 9/11, 
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as opposed to its complete absence in the pre-9/11 era, represents a shift in the dominant 
discourse and changes how readers might understand the Russo-Chechen conflict. The stigma 
associated with the “terrorist” label of irrationality and immorality may limit the readers’ 
understanding of the Chechens’ historical experience and perspective of the conflict. While it is 
difficult to know how readers reacted to or internalized this new perspective, the shift in 
coverage made it more likely that readers could draw inaccurate conclusions about the conflict 
and hence about potential resolutions to it. 
Following 9/11, the publications provided increasingly in-depth and personal coverage of 
the Russian victims of each attack. Although all six of the attacks targeted civilians (including 
women and children), in the post-9/11 era the newspapers utilized victim narratives, personal 
interviews, and graphic background descriptions to present a more vivid and intimate 
presentation of the events. As a result of this shift, readers of the post-9/11 coverage were 
probably much more likely to empathize with and relate to the experience of the victims. This 
study has argued that the personal experiences and reactions of the staffs of all three newspapers 
to the events of 9/11 accounts for this shift in tone and interpretation of the alleged Chechen 
attacks and the appearance of a much more intimate and in-depth perspective of the victim 
experience.  
This accounts for the much less balanced coverage of Russian and Chechen perspectives 
in the post-9/11 era. Given that reporters had ready access to the sites of the post-9/11 attacks, it 
is not surprising that the Russian point of view was overrepresented within the coverage. 
However, the downplaying of the Chechen point of view, as opposed to the more balanced 
presentation in the pre-9/11 era, changed in notable ways the interpretation of the conflict found 
in the newspapers, an interpretation that stressed the Russians as victims and the Chechens as 
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perpetuators of terrorism. The contrast between the Chechens as victims of Russian aggression 
before 9/11 and shifting identity of the victim is significant.  
Finally, following 9/11, each of the newspapers focused less on creating a historical 
context for the attacks and instead relied increasingly on evoking the “wave of terror” to set the 
context for the attacks.  This shift represents a conscious decision to downplay the historical 
roots of the Russo-Chechen conflict in the post-9/11 era. Instead, readers are exposed to an 
interpretation that highlights the phenomenon of terrorism as the driving force of the conflict, an 
interpretation that links the events to the US War on Terror rather than to the Russo-Chechen 
Wars. Such a shift in perspective suggests that readers will be less likely to understand the 
historical contentions between the Russians and Chechens, and thus misunderstand the political 
and cultural motivations behind the specific acts of violence. This may lead readers to incorrectly 
assume that the Russo-Chechen conflict operates by the same circumstances as the US 
experience with terrorism, thus inhibiting readers from identifying valid methods for resolution. 
Overall, these shifts provide readers of the three newspapers post-9/11 coverage with a 
very different interpretation of the Russo-Chechen conflict than that offered before 9/11. The 
new interpretation provides much less attention to the historical separatist movement of the 
Chechens and instead paints the attackers as terrorists without a name or cause. The lack of 
historical background or attention to the Chechen experience presents readers and US policy 
makers with an incomplete or incorrect interpretation of the conflict as a whole. It is telling that 
US criticism, from the public, media, and policymakers, of Russian policy in Chechnya waned 
significantly after the events of September 11. Unlike the case of Yeltsin in the First Russo-
Chechen War, the US did not pressure Putin to end his conflict in Chechnya. Hence the brutal 
fighting continued indefinitely. 
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However, it is prudent to acknowledge the constraints of these conclusions. Due to the 
limited nature of this analysis, it is impossible to generalize about the nature of all US media 
coverage before and after 9/11. Nevertheless, the conclusions identified in this work are still eye 
opening to the potential effect of experiential bias on the perspective of print news media in 
regards to external events. The conclusions of this work call for further analysis of the effects of 
domestic events on the coverage provided by media of external events. Additionally, these 
conclusions call for a more critical approach to media representation and its potential effect on 
readers. One insight that this study makes clear is that the print media is not the unbiased 
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FRAMES OF REPRESENTATION 
Chechen attackers as separatists: 
The “Chechen attackers as separatists” refers to the labels used by the newspapers in 
identifying and discussing the attackers in each event. This frame of representation encompasses 
the descriptive terms: rebels, hostage-takers, militants, and guerillas along with the term 
separatists. In identifying this frame of representation, this author carefully analyzed each of the 
articles for every event that specifically referred to the attackers  and took careful note of which 
labels were used by the three newspapers in each case. 
 
Chechen attackers as terrorists: 
 The “Chechen attackers as terrorists” also refers to the labels applied to the attackers in 
each event. In this case, the frame of representation only refers to the direct use of terrorist (as 
well as its various forms, i.e. terror, terrorism) in describing the attackers. The identification of 
this frame involved the careful analysis of the descriptive labels used in all articles addressing 
the attackers.  
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Impersonal depiction of victims: 
 This frame of representation centers on the ways that the newspapers presented the 
personal narrative of victims of the attack in each article. Articles exhibiting this frame of 
representation are characterized by a lack of detail and attention attributed to the victims and 
their experience of the attack, as well as a lack of graphic depictions of the event and its 
aftermath. In identifying this frame, this author read each article carefully and analyzed the 
language and descriptions attributed to victims. 
 
Personal depiction of victims: 
 The “personal depiction of victims” frame of representation is focused on the attention 
given to victims by the articles of each publication. Examples of this frame include articles that 
present extensive detail on victims, their experience, and their background, as well as articles 
that provide graphic depictions of the event and its aftermath.  
 
Chechen POV:  
 This frame of representation focuses on the points of view presented by the newspapers 
in their coverage. Examples of this frame provide readers with a Chechen perspective of the 
event or conflict as a whole through the subject of the article itself, context provided, or 
interviews with Chechens. This author identified this frame of representation by carefully 




 The “Russian POV” frame of representation addresses the points of view presented in the 
coverage of each newspaper. Articles exhibiting this frame include a Russian perspective 
through interviews with Russians, specific context provided, or the subject of the article itself. In 
order to identify the “Russian POV” frame of representation, this author carefully analyzed the 
coverage of each paper and evaluated the viewpoints provided in each article. 
 
Context of historical conflict: 
 The “context of historical conflict” frame of representation centers on the particular 
context presented in the reporting of each newspaper. Examples of this frame present readers 
with a context of historical dispute between Russians and Chechens, highlighting historical 
events within the conflict (wars, deportation, and other historical events). In identifying this 
frame of representation, this author analyzed the context of each article, and evaluated the focus 
of these contexts. 
 
Context of wave of terror: 
 This frame of representation refers to the specific context presented for readers by the 
articles of each publication. Articles exhibiting this frame provide a context that dismisses the 
historical aspects of the conflict in favor of an explanation centered on terrorism as a 
phenomenon. These articles may discuss previous terror attacks within Russia, or tie the event to 
the idea of international terrorism. In order to identify this frame of representation, this author 
considered the context provided for the events in each article by the publications, and identified 
the explanative focus of these contexts. 
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